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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effect of Branding and Firm Size on the Recurrence of Food Recall Events 
Associated with Pathogenic Contamination in the United States. 
 (May 2012) 
Montalee Kapilakanchana, B.S., Kasetsart University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Victoria Salin 
 
 Food recalls caused by pathogens receive considerable public attention due to 
health risk and the potential loss to the companies involved. There are very few studies 
analyzing the relationship between food recalls and characteristics of the companies 
involved. Because of the significance of the problem and lack of available research, the 
association between food recalls caused by pathogen and characteristics of the 
companies involved is examined in this thesis. 
 To address the problem, data on food product recalls in the United States 
from January 2000 to October 2009 are used. Only the events caused by pathogens are 
analyzed in the thesis. The firms that have multiple recall incidents are the units of 
analysis. The study employs an econometric model with discrete choice modeling 
approaches: logit and probit.  
 There are two main hypotheses. Firstly, it is hypothesized that branding 
decreases the likelihood of the occurrence of the repeated recall event. Secondly, size of 
the firm is hypothesized to be associated with higher likelihood of recurrence. The major 
finding is that branding and firm size are associated with higher probability of the 
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recurrence of food recall events associated with pathogenic contamination. A firm that 
produces branded products is around 15 percent more likely to have a recurrence of food 
recall events than a firm producing unbranded product. This finding points out the 
interesting and unexpected issue that branding is not associated with improved 
performance in food safety. Additionally, an increase in firm size has a minute but 
significant association with rising likelihood to have a recurrence of a food recall event. 
This study is the first concerning the firm level factors that can influence risk of the 
recurrence of food recall incidents involving pathogens. Thus, its results are distinctive 
and can benefit both government and private sectors with respect to food safety policy or 
food safety standards.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 While the food supply in the United States is often claimed to be one of the safest 
in the world, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that each 
year there are approximately 48 million episodes of foodborne illness-causing sickness 
to 1 in 6 Americans annually. The consequence is roughly 128,000 hospitalizations and 
3,000 deaths (Scallan et al. 2011a; 2011b). The CDC 2011 estimates highlight the fact 
that foodborne illnesses caused by pathogens are the leading reason for foodborne 
illnesses in the U.S.  
 Foodborne illnesses due to pathogen contamination can be closely linked to food 
product recall events. For example, in 2009 a severe salmonellosis outbreak in peanut 
butter caused approximately 9 deaths and 714 cases of illnesses (CDC 2009). This 
incident brought about a vast recall of 3,918 peanut butter related products from 361 
brand names across 43 states of the U.S. (FDA 2009b). The latest serious foodborne 
illness outbreak in the U.S. is the listeriosis outbreak of whole cantaloupes distributed 
from Jensen Farms. As of November 1, 2011, 29 deaths and 139 cases of illnesses have 
reportedly been linked to the outbreak (CDC 2011).  
 It is obvious that food recalls caused by pathogenic contamination are associated  
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with public health problems and even consumers’ deaths. Moreover, the manufacturers 
that announce the food recalls also risk financial damage or even a failure that drives the 
firms out of business.  For example, Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) that 
announced a large recall of peanut butter in September, 2011 is undergoing bankruptcy 
(FDA 2009b). Due to the possible great loss of consumers, companies and trading 
partners, the public and the private sectors pay increasing attention to the recall events 
caused by pathogens. 
 Recently, the food recalls associated with pathogenic contamination have been 
growing in a number of events. Furthermore, there are increasingly widespread concerns 
for all the agents involved. This has also raised the question about what factors influence 
the food recall events associated with pathogenic contamination. The answer to this 
question is very helpful for both public and private sectors in order to have a better 
understanding on this important problem. Since, food recall problems often result from 
the deficiencies of companies themselves, it is important to focus on the private sectors 
or companies that produce food products more than the public sectors or the 
government. Hence, this thesis will examine firm-level factors that influence the food 
recalls caused by pathogens. 
 A food recall is an undesirable and harmful incident for the food companies 
because it implies that firms fail to provide safe and quality foods to consumers. The 
firm will not announce the recall unless it needs to. Once a recall occurs, the firm should 
try to improve its food safety performance in order to not let the recall happens again. 
Thus, the recurrence of a recall event implies that the firm lacks of an ability to provide a 
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sufficient performance in food safety. That is why we decided to use the recurrence of a 
recall event as an indicator of food safety performance for the firm. 
 There are very few research studies about the link between companies and food 
recall events. The thesis by Joy (2010) is the most similar research to our main focus. 
However, the major difference is that his study used all of the food recall events over 
2000 through 2009, but in this thesis we will use only the food recalls caused by 
pathogenic contamination. Joy’s findings were that branding and firm size had 
significant effects on the hazard of the recurrence of a recall. According to his interesting 
findings, the thesis question we will investigate is the effect of branding and firm size on 
the food recall recurrence associated with pathogenic contamination.  
 
Objectives 
 This thesis will pursue two objectives: 
 To examine how branding and firm size affect the likelihood of the firm’s 
recurrence of a recall event caused by pathogenic contamination; and 
 To estimate the size of the effects of branding and firm size on the probability of 
a firm that has the recurrence of a recall event. 
 
To pursue the main objectives, this thesis consists of the next six chapters. The 
next chapter (the second chapter), we will provide literature focus on the economic 
concept and food safety issues. The third chapter, we will discuss about the data utilized 
in this study. The fourth chapter, we will then present the suitable econometric models 
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employed in the study and also the expectations based on the economic and management 
frameworks. Next, in the fifth chapter, we will show the major findings and the 
additional interesting findings including the discussion from our examination. Finally, 
the conclusions including implications, limitations and further research will be presented 
in the last chapter.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter presents information and past research related to food companies 
and food recall events in the first two sections: economies of scale and food safety. 
Additionally, the last section of the chapter, discrete choice models, also discusses about 
the theoretical basis of the econometric models employed in this study. 
 
Economies of Scale 
 In defining economies of scale and scope, we rely on the explanation of the 
theory from Besanko (2010) in chapter 2. Besanko (2010) as well as other 
microeconomic textbooks defines economies of scale as the cost advantage when the 
average cost of production becomes lower as the producer expands its output. On the 
other side, when the average cost of production rises as output increases we say that a 
firm experiences diseconomies of scale. 
 The relation between average costs and output can be represented by an average 
cost curve. Typically economists describe average cost curve as U-shaped, as shown in 
figure 1. An average cost curve begins with the descent of average costs because of the 
spreading of fixed costs over extra units of output. As production grows, average costs 
increase as production encounter some difficulties such as capacity constraints, 
complexity, and transaction costs. This average cost curve which has a U-shape can be 
implied that over the range of different firm sizes, there is a possible for large firms to 
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not have economies of scale or the inefficiency in firm operation can happen due to a 
large size. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A U-shaped average cost curve 
Source: Besanko (2010, p.42) 
 
 
 
 
 However, Besanko (2010) states that in reality, large firms infrequently seem to 
have huge cost disadvantages compared to smaller competitors. This was based on the 
finding from the examination of production costs in many industries by the famous 
econometrician Johnston. Johnston determined that, in reality, the cost curves were more 
similar to L-shaped curves than to U-shaped curves. An L-shaped cost curve depicted in 
figure 2 shows that average costs fall until they meet the minimum efficient scale (MES) 
of production. When output goes beyond MES, average costs are the same across 
production levels.  
 Consider a single firm, an average cost curve can be a U-shaped or L-shaped 
curve depending on a different time frame of the production. In the short run, production 
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occasionally exhibits U-shaped average cost curve since the firm spread over the same 
fixed assets or overheads in the first stage and then face with its capacity limitation in 
the second stage. The firm cannot expand its capacity in the short term. While, in the 
long run, by constructing new facilities the firm can enlarge its capacity to reach a 
production level that keeps its average costs low. Hence, the average cost curve in the 
long run is an L shape. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An L-shaped average cost curve 
Source: Besanko (2010, p.43) 
 
 
 
 
 Economies of scale is an important issue in food industries. For example, in meat 
and poultry industries, economies of scale is a crucial key to determine a plant cost 
structure. This statement is supported by Duewer and Nelson (1991), MacDonald et al. 
(2000), and Ward (1993) in cattle slaughter, MacDonald and Ollinger (2000) in hog 
slaughter, and Ollinger, MacDonald, and Madison (2000) in poultry slaughter. Each 
study is elaborated in the following.  
  
8 
 MacDonald et al. (2000) found the moderate but widespread existence of 
economies of scale in hog and cattle slaughter plants. The cost advantages for the largest 
plants were only 1 to 3 percent more than smaller plants; however, the scale economies 
existed in all plant sizes in 1992. Moreover, they suggested that the modest economies of 
scope might exist in cattle slaughter plants. 
 Furthermore, for the study of cattle slaughter, Ward (1993) compared the results 
from two past studies; the study of Sersland (1985) and the study of Duewer and Nelson 
(1991), in the same subject of economies of size of cattle slaughtering and fabrication. 
He found that even though the two studies used different data and methods, the results 
from both studies were similar. The results show that estimated average cost of both 
slaughter and fabrication plants declined as plant size became larger. In other words, the 
economies of scale existed in both slaughter and fabrication plants. Ward (1993) also 
asserted that firms that were in the beef packing industry had an economic motivation to 
operate at a larger plant size in order to keep plants functioning near full-capacity 
utilization. 
 In hog slaughter industry, MacDonald and Ollinger (2000) found the moderate 
but widespread existence of economies of scale. In poultry slaughter industry, Ollinger, 
MacDonald, and Madison (2000) found the existence of economies of scale as well. 
Their results indicated that there is a 15-percent decrease in plant average costs for 
chicken slaughter plants that produce at four times greater than the sample mean volume. 
Likewise, turkey slaughter plants that manufacture at four times of the sample mean 
volume have a 17 percent reduction in average costs compare to turkey plants that 
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produce at the sample mean volume. Ollinger, MacDonald, and Madison (2000) also 
stated that poultry plants exploited economies of scale by producing at the larger 
volume. This is supported by the fact that in 1992 and 1967, the number of poultry 
plants was approximately the same even though the poultry production amount in 1992 
was three times larger than in 1967. 
 
 Economies of Scale and Safety 
 In considering food safety control, we expect to have an existing of economies of 
scale. For example, the cost of hiring quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) 
personnel is an indivisible fixed cost, which is one of main sources of scale economies. 
“Fixed costs arise when there are indivisibilities in the production process. Indivisibility 
simply means that an input cannot be scaled down below a certain minimum size, even 
when the level of output is very small” (Besanko 2010, p.45). Thus, if each plant 
requires at least one QA and one QC to examine products, the firm can get the financial 
benefit from reducing average cost per unit, when it expands its output or we say that the 
firm can enjoy economies of scale.  
 Our expectation is supported by the new standard in food safety management 
systems in the food packaging industry that requires each plant that makes food 
packaging has to employ one practitioner. This new standard is one of the standards in 
the Safe Quality Food (SQF) certification. SQF is one of the leading private-sector 
global food safety and quality certifications and is recognized by the Global Food Safety 
Initiative (GFSI) as a standard that satisfies its benchmark requirements. The standard is 
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for at least one professional called an SQF practitioner to be employed. An SQF 
practitioner is a permanent full time company employee and has training in hazard 
analysis and critical control points (HACCP) systems and the SQF auditing standard. 
The responsibilities of an SQF practitioner is developing, implementing and maintaining 
the safety assurance system of the company. According to the new rule having one 
practitioner per plant, the packaging company could have economies of scale in the food 
safety control department as described in the previous paragraph. 
 In addition, another example of economies of scale in food safety control 
happens when the machines used for safety control processes such as heating or 
steaming are capital-intensive. These machines are viewed as an indivisible fixed cost 
and function with scale economies. 
 In spite of the potential for scale economies, Ollinger and Mueller (2003) found 
that the sanitation and process control effort exhibits diseconomies of scale since cost of 
sanitation and process control rises as output increases. They argued that however, it 
appears to have a diseconomies of scale in food safety process control effort but overall, 
the larger plants still benefit from scale economies by lowering total cost of producing 
an additional product. This conflicting evidence calls into question whether firms can 
achieve the scale economies from food safety control process. 
 
Food Safety 
 Since, food safety issues are becoming more important worldwide, governments 
from many countries including the United States of America (USA) are increasing their 
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attempts to enhance food safety. These attempts are due to an increasing level of 
consumer concerns and food safety problems.  
 In the USA, food safety concerns have considerably increased as meat products 
contamination events occurred in the past ten years (Piggott and Marsh 2004). Recently, 
the concerns have intensified because of the outbreak of Salmonella spp. in peanut butter 
in 2009 and the listeriosis outbreak from cantaloupes in 2011. The concerns result from 
many hospitalizations or even deaths of consumers caused by contaminated food 
products.  
 According to Scallan et al. (2011a; 2011b), the estimated number of foodborne 
illnesseses that occur each year in the USA is 47.8 million cases of illness, resulting in 
127,839 hospitalizations and 3,037 deaths. Among these cases of foodborne illnesses, 
the 31 highest risk foodborne pathogens in the USA accounted for 9.4 million illnesses, 
leading to 55,961 hospitalizations, and 1,351 deaths for each year. Among the 31 most 
important pathogens, leading causes of foodborne illnesses were norovirus (58 percent), 
followed by nontyphoidal Salmonella spp. (11 percent), and Campylobacter spp. (9 
percent). Most hospitalizations (35 percent) were caused by nontyphoidal Salmonella 
spp., followed by norovirus (26 percent), and Campylobacter spp. (15 percent). Most 
deaths (28 percent) were caused by nontyphoidal Salmonella spp., followed by 
Toxoplasma gondii (24 percent), and Listeria monocytogenes (19 percent).  
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Food Recalls 
 An important measure in the USA used to prevent the public from consuming 
contaminated product is a food recall. Before 2011, the food recall was a voluntary 
action implemented by a firm under the provisions of the government agencies.  The 
intention of a recall is to take away food products that are reasonably believed to be 
misbranded or adulterated from commerce to prevent consumers from health problems 
or even deaths (FSIS 2011). 
 Recalls of contaminated food products are increasing in the rate of occurrences 
and severity (Skees, Botts, and Zeuli 2001). Meat products had been the major cause of 
food product recalls for a decade. However, recently, nut products have been added as a 
major cause of food product recalls during the 2000’s as problems occurred in almonds 
and peanut products. The consequences of the food recalls not only effect consumers but 
also the responsible company.  
 A large food recall can cause a massive economic loss to a responsible firm. In 
the meat and poultry industries, there is a clear evidence of the significant loss for the 
processor companies. For example, Hudson Foods, a large beef processor, recalled a 
total of 25 million pounds of ground beef in 1997 (Skees, Botts, and Zeuli 2001). The 
recall was implemented because of the suspected contamination of E. coli O157:H7 and 
the lack of a clear lotting system to clearly separate processing days. The severe 
consequence of this recall is that Hudson Foods shut down its plant and exited the 
industry. Additionally, Thorn Apple Valley Inc., which was a meat and poultry 
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processor, went bankrupt in 1999 due to the recall of 30 million pounds of its products 
contaminated with Listeria (Skees, Botts, and Zeuli 2001). 
 While Hudson Foods and Thorn Apple Valley Inc. could not deal with the large 
expenses from their recalls, some companies are able to overcome the difficulties of 
recalls and still move on with their businesses. For example, Sara Lee Corporation 
recalled their meat products due to a Listeria contamination at the Bil Mar Foods 
subsidiary in 1998 (Skees, Botts, and Zeuli 2001). The company lost approximately $76 
million from removing their contaminated products and closing the production lines 
during the outbreak (Dwyer 1999 as cited by Skees, Botts, and Zeuli 2001).  Even 
though, this was a great loss to the company at that time, it still exists in business.  
 
Firm Product-Recall Strategies 
 The two main strategies that firms apply to manage recall events are proactive 
and passive strategies. These strategies are categorized by firms’ reactions to a recall 
event (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994). The firm implementing the proactive or 
responsible strategy tends to announce a voluntary recall when the firm realizes a 
potentially unsafe product by inspections inside the firm and before any public safety 
incidents are reported. Conversely, the firm adopting passive or defensive strategy is 
more likely to delay or avoid a product recall. The passive recalls are frequently issued 
after severe incidents happen to consumers such as injuries or death (Chen, Ganesan and 
Liu 2009). 
  
14 
 Several researchers have shown that a proactive strategy results in positive 
consumer perceptions of firms. Firms are perceived to have a greater quality, if they act 
responsibly to the general public (Siegel and Vitaliano 2007). Consumers perceive that a 
firm is more responsible if it takes action before required by a government agency (Jolly 
and Mowen 1984; Shrivastava and Siomkos 1989). In addition, the negative effect of 
product-harm crisis on consumers’ future purchases and their perceptions will be 
mitigated if a firm actively responds to a recall (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994). 
Furthermore, a proactive strategy can be perceived as a signal for firm’s reliability and 
care of consumers. In general, consumers are likely to interpret these two strategic 
alternatives as an indication of firm’s trustworthiness and quality of firm’s products and 
services (Chen, Ganesan and Liu 2009). 
 Even though, some studies showed a firm gets benefits or the positive feedbacks 
from consumers by adopting a proactive strategy, Chen, Ganesan and Liu (2009) 
proposed that  unlike consumers, investors and the stock market might have negative 
feedbacks on the proactive approach. Their finding indicated that a firm that uses a 
proactive strategy to a recall event has more damage on their financial value than a firm 
that uses a passive approach. The explanation is that the investors and the stock market 
tend to view firm’s proactive action as an indicator of large financial loss and severe 
product danger. Salin and Hooker (2001) studied about the responses of shareholders 
returns resulting from food recalls. They found that the returns to shareholders of the 
smallest firm, Odwalla, dropped instantaneously after the recall event. This result is 
consistent with the findings from Chen, Ganesan and Liu (2009). 
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 Because of some advantages and some drawbacks on both product-recall 
strategies, firms may choose a different strategy depending on their priority concerns 
(consumers or investors) and the severity degree of the food contamination incidents. 
 
Discrete Choice Models 
 In describing the discrete choice models, the explanation of the models is heavily 
based on four books: Greene (2003), Gujarati (1995), Train (2009), and Wooldridge 
(2009). Greene’s (2003), Gujarati’s (1995), and Wooldridge’s (2009) books are general 
econometric reference works, while, Train’s (2009) is the leading book especially in the 
area of the discrete choice models. They defined discrete choice models as the 
qualitative response models in which the economic outcome is a discrete choice. The 
discrete choice is chosen by a decision maker among a finite set of options. In other 
words, the dependent variables in the discrete models are discrete values representing 
some qualitative outcome. For example, a yes decision equals one and a no decision 
equals zero.  The general approach used to analyze the relation between the decision or 
the outcome and a set of factors is the probability model (Greene 2003, p.664): 
(1)  Prob (event j occurs) = Prob (Y=j) = F [relevant effect, parameters].  
 Discrete choice models can be classified by the number of alternatives. If there 
are two available alternatives, the models were called binomial or binary choice models. 
For three or more alternatives, the models were known as multinomial choice models. 
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Binary Choice Models 
 The model for binary choice contains a binary response variable that can only be 
either zero or one. For example, suppose we want to study the factors that influence 
whether a Ph.D. student passes the qualifying exam. The binary outcome for this 
example is that a student passes or fails the exam. The binary dependent variable can be 
defined as one for passing and zero for failing. 
 Two common approaches used to analyze binary choice models are the logit 
model and the probit model.  
 
Logit and Probit Models 
 To explain the logit and probit models, we consider the simple probability model 
(1). The outcome is either an event occurs (Y=1) or does not (Y=0).  The relevant effects 
are represented by a vector x or a set of explanatory variables and the set of parameters 
are presented as β. Thus, we obtained the following probability models (Greene 2003). 
(2)    Prob (Y = 1 | x) = F (x, β)   
    Prob (Y = 0 | x) = 1 - F (x, β) 
 The two features needed in the probability models: the probability or response 
variable lies between zero and one, and the probability varies nonlinearly with x 
(Gujarati 1995). The model for a probability is shown in figure 3. Hence, the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) which has the sigmoid or S-shaped curve is suitable to use in 
the probability models. 
 
 
  
17 
 
Figure 3. Model for a probability 
Source: Greene (2003, p.666) 
 
 
 
 
 The two CDFs commonly chosen to represent the binary choice models are the 
logistic and the standard normal CDFs.  The logistic CDF gives rise to the logit model, 
while, the standard normal CDF underlies the probit model (Gujarati 1995). The 
important point is that these two models are suitable to analyze binary responses, 
because they can satisfy the two requirements in the probability model considered 
earlier. 
 Pertaining to Wooldridge (2009), the function in the logit model is a logistic 
function, Λ (z): 
 (3)    Λ                        
 z is latent, or unobserved variable, derived from  
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 (4)                                   , 
where ε is the error or disturbance term. 
 ε has the standard logistic distribution which is symmetrically distributed 
(Wooldridge 2009). In other words, we would say that the logistic disturbances generate 
the logit model (Greene 2003). 
 Hence, according to Greene (2003), the logit model can be written as 
(5)                                      
 Λ(.) is the notation for the logistic cumulative distribution function. The logit 
model is one of the appropriate models suitable used to analyze binary choice models. 
For all real numbers z, the logistic function, Λ (z), is between zero and one (Wooldridge 
2009). Hence, it is assured that the probabilities from this model constrained to the 0-1 
interval which is the key point of the model for a probability. 
 The other approach that is widely used for studying binary choice is the probit 
model. In the probit model, the cumulative distribution function (cdf) is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function, Φ(.), rather than the logistic function, Λ (.), in 
the logit model. According to Greene (2003), the probit model is presented as: 
(6)                  
   
  
               
where      is the standard normal density. 
     or z* is an latent variable, derived from 
(7)                                    , 
where   represents a set of estimated parameters; u is the error or disturbance term. 
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 This is the same concept as presented in the logit model. However, the main 
difference from the logit model is that in the probit model, u has the standard normal 
distribution. Thus, normally distributed disturbances produce the probit model (Greene 
2003). 
 The probit model as well as the logit model guarantees that the estimated 
probabilities lie between zero and one. As, Φ(z*) is a function giving values strictly in 
the range between zero and one: 0< Φ(z*) <1, for all real number z*.  
 
Comparing between Logit and Probit Models 
 The CDFs of logit and probit models are quite similar, however; the main 
difference is that the logistic has slightly flatter tails than the normal or probit. In other 
words, the logistic curve comes near the axes more slowly than the normal or probit 
curve as shown in figure 4 (Gujarati 1995). 
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Figure 4. Logit and probit CDFs 
Source: Gujarati (1995, p.568) 
 
 
 
 
 Because of this similarity of the logit and probit distributions, it is difficult to 
choose between these two models. There are many discussions about this issue. 
Amemiya (1981) stated that the probit and logit models generally provide similar results 
and therefore statistically distinguishing between them is not easy. This discussion is 
also supported by Greene (2003) that there does not seem to make much difference of 
the selection between the two models.  
 Although, the preference between logit and probit models is still unclear, 
Wooldridge (2009) concluded that in econometrics, the probit model is preferred to logit 
because of the popularity of the normal distribution. In the opposite way, Train (2009, 
p.34) argued that “By far the easiest and most widely used discrete choice model is logit. 
Its popularity is due to the fact that the formula for the choice probabilities takes a closed 
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form and is readily interpretable.”  Because of this contradiction, we should look at the 
advantages and disadvantages of these two models. 
 As stated earlier, one of the advantages of the logit model is its convenient form 
for the discrete choice probability. Furthermore, the logistic CDF is simpler than the 
normal CDF, which is related to an unevaluated integral. For the interpretability, when 
one transforms the logit model in to the linear model: Z = a +b X, Z has a direct 
interpretation as a log-odds. While, in case of the probit, Z has no direct interpretation. 
Besides the log-odds, an odds ratio can be derived from the logit model, while the probit 
cannot. Hence, the logit model is better than the probit in the aspect of simplicity, the 
mathematical convenience, and the interpretability.  
 Despite these advantages, the logit model still has disadvantages. The main 
disadvantage is that the logit model cannot deal with random taste variation and the 
correlations over time (Train 2009). This limitation in the logit model due to its 
assumption becomes the important advantage for probit model. The probit model is 
flexible to deal with this limitation.  Thus, in the aspect of the flexibility in handling 
specific problems, the probit model is better. 
 The probit models are used in many economic studies. In food safety economics, 
Ollinger and Mueller (2003) also employed the probit model to study about meat and 
poultry plant exits and the food safety control. 
 In this chapter, we provided major literature involved in the thesis, which are the 
economic concept of economies of scale, food safety issues, and the theoretical basis of 
discrete choice models. Next chapter, we will discuss about the data utilized in the study. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA 
 
 The data used in this thesis are well organized and also obtained from credible 
sources. Most of the information in the data sets we used is acquired from Joy (2010); 
however, we updated and made some adjustments to the information in order to make it 
more suited to our study. In order to acquire the valid outcome from the data, appropriate 
software was utilized.  
 This chapter is separated in to four parts. The first part is the information of food 
product recall events caused by pathogens. The second part provided the information of 
the companies related to the recall events. The main issues of company are brand 
information, the number of employees and sales. The third part is the analysis of selected 
variables. In the last part, we will describe for only the observations that are going to be 
analyzed in the model in the next chapter.  
 
Food Product Recall Event Information 
 The study is based on the information of food product recall events in the U.S. 
from January 2000 through October 2009. The information of recall events was obtained 
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Food Safety Inspection Service 
(FSIS). Press releases issued by the FDA and the FSIS were collected from Recalls, 
Market Withdrawals and Safety Alerts website (FSIS 2009) and Recall Case Archive 
website (FDA 2009a) respectively. Each recall event provides the following information: 
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firm name, location of the firm (city and state), recall event date, type of recall product, 
recall problem, and firm contact information. 
 The recall event information were selected only the recall events caused by 
pathogens such as Salmonella spp., Listeria spp. We considerably focus on this group of 
recall events, since recently there are substantially high concerns on the product recall 
resulting in foodborne illnesses in the U.S.  
 During 2000 to 2009, the total number of recall events caused by pathogens was 
1,394. Most product recalls were caused by Salmonella spp. (56.06 percent), followed by 
Listeria spp. (27.46 percent), E. coli (10.82 percent), and other bacteria (5.66 percent). 
The figures are shown in table 1. Looking at types of product recalls in table 2, we 
observe that the most high- risk product for recall events is meat products (32.14 
percent), followed by nut products (23.60 percent), and confectionary and bakery 
products (16.93 percent). In this case, we defined meat products as the product which 
includes at least one of these types of products: beef, poultry, pork, seafood and others 
meats.  The meat product is also the most high-risk product for all of each type of 
pathogen stated above except Salmonella spp. The percentages of meat product recalls 
caused by Listeria spp., E. coli, and other bacteria are 66.06 percent, 94.04 percent, and 
37.97 percent respectively as given in table 3 to table 6. While, the product recall events 
caused by Salmonella spp. were found mostly in the nut products (41.94 percent). 
 Types of food products have different risk characteristics and profiles. For 
example, raw products such as meat has to be cooked before consume. Thus, if a 
consumer properly cooks them, foodborne illness problem will not occur even though 
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the raw products may be less safe or low quality products. In the opposite way, the 
processed or ready-to-eat products are those that are safe to eat without cooking. Since 
the processed products do not need any preparation before consume, any mistake in food 
safety of the products can easily cause foodborne illness problem. Table 2 shows that in 
the food recall data, the processed products account for 9.47 percent of recall events. 
However, the product type is not the main interest in this study so we do not categorize 
recall by product type in the analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Numbers and Percentages of Product Recalls Classified by Types of 
Pathogens from the Recall Event Information during 2000-2009  
Pathogen Number Percent 
Salmonella spp. 782 56.06 
Listeria spp. 383 27.46 
E. coli 151 10.82 
Others Bacteria 79 5.66 
Total 1395 100.00 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
Note: 1) The total number is 1395 because we have one observation that has both of Listeria spp. 
   and Salmonella spp.  
2) The total number of observations is 1394. 
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Table 2. Numbers and Percentages of Product Recalls Classified by Types of 
Products from the Recall Event Information during 2000-2009  
Product Number Percent 
Meat 448  32.14 
Nut 329  23.60 
Confectionary-Bakery 236  16.93 
Dairy 165  11.84 
Others (Not Meats) 88 6.31 
Other Fruit- Vegetables 69  4.95 
Fresh Fruit 28  2.01 
Fresh Vegetables 26  1.87 
Beverage 4  0.29 
Juice 1 0.07 
Total 1394  100.00 
Processed 132 9.47 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Numbers and Percentages of Product Recalls Caused by Listeria spp. and 
Classified by Types of Products from the Recall Event Information during 2000-
2009  
Product Number Percent 
Meat 253 66.06 
Dairy 70  18.28 
Other Fruit- Vegetables 22  5.74 
Others (Not Meats) 20  5.22 
Confectionary-Bakery 11 2.87 
Fresh Vegetables 4 1.04 
Fresh Fruit 2  0.52 
Nut 1  0.26 
Total 383 100.00 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
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Table 4. Numbers and Percentages of Product Recalls Caused by E. coli and 
Classified by Types of Products from the Recall Event Information during 2000-
2009  
Product Number Percent 
Meat 142  94.04 
Fresh Fruit 3  1.99 
Dairy 2 1.32 
Other Fruit- Vegetables 2  0.85 
Confectionary-Bakery 1  0.66 
Others (Not Meats) 1  0.66 
Total 151 100.00 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Numbers and Percentages of Product Recalls Caused by Salmonella spp. 
and Classified by Types of Products from the Recall Event Information during 
2000-2009  
Product Number Percent 
Nut 328  41.94 
Confectionary-Bakery 222  28.39 
Dairy 90  11.51 
Others (Not Meats) 47  6.01 
Meat 24 3.07 
Other Fruit-Vegetables 26  3.32 
Fresh Fruit 22  2.81 
Fresh Vegetables 21  2.69 
Juice 1  0.13 
Beverage 1  0.13 
Total 782 100.00 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
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Table 6. Numbers and Percentages of Product Recalls Caused by Other Bacteria 
and Classified by Types of Products from the Recall Event Information during 
2000-2009 
Product Number Percent 
Subtotal Meat 30  37.97 
Others (Not Meats) 20  25.32 
Other Fruit- Vegetables 19  24.05 
Dairy 3 3.80 
Beverage 3  3.80 
Confectionary-Bakery 2  2.53 
Fresh Fruit 1  1.27 
Fresh Vegetables 1  1.27 
Total 79 100.00 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
 
 
 
 
 The data collected are the recall events from 2000 to 2009.  Since most of the 
recall occurrences took place in 2009, the number of recall occurrences is thus high in 
this year compared to other years (see table 7).  Also, the graph (shown in figure 5) has 
been generated to illustrate the trend of product recall events during 2000 to 2009.   It is 
noticed that the fluctuation of the recall event numbers in the year of 2000 to 2008 has 
caused the wavy pattern in the graph; yet, the number of recall events for each year is 
not much different from the others.  However, in 2009, the numbers of recall 
occurrences spiked dramatically thus, an extremely sharp slope is produced.  This rising 
of product recall events occurrence in the recent years should, therefore, be given 
attention. 
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Table 7. Occurrences of Product Recall Events by Year from 2000 to 2009 
Year Number of recall events Percent 
2000 82 5.88 
2001 73 5.24 
2002 98 7.03 
2003 60 4.30 
2004 99 7.10 
2005 77 5.52 
2006 51 3.66 
2007 93 6.67 
2008 89 6.38 
2009 672 48.21 
Total 1394 100.00 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Trend of number of recall events by year from 2000 to 2009 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
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Company Information 
 In the study, we defined a company as a corporate parent company. Since, we 
would like to see the overall image of the company. Thus, subsidiary companies that 
have the same parent company will be presented as the same company.  
 The company information includes two parts. In the first part, the information 
was acquired from Hoover’s Company information Database (2009). This company 
information includes financial detailed information of the corporate parent company: 
company name, amount of sales in million dollars, number of employees, and type of 
company. Sales and employee figures are collected from the newest available 
information on the website. Type of company is separated as a manufacturer, retailer, or 
food service supplier. 
 The second part is company information on brand. Numerous individuals put a 
lot of effort into the work on the brand information in this study. Thus, the brand 
information is very valuable and unique information in this study. The information on 
company’s brand includes whether a company has a brand or not represented by brand 
binary variable and the number of brands per company for the branded company. Hence, 
we created a brand binary variable (BRAND). If a company has a brand, the brand 
binary variable equals one, otherwise zero. 
 We have the company information of a total of 1,005 companies that were 
reported on the recall events caused by pathogens during 2000 to 2009. A problem exists 
because some company information cannot be obtained. Hence, some companies are 
lacking some information such as sales figure or employee figure.  According to table 8, 
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all of the companies have information on brand (whether they have their brand or not). 
However, only 974 companies have the information on the number of brands. Sales 
(million dollars) and the number of employees are two major figures used for company 
size grouping. There are only 334 and 310 companies having employee and sales figures 
respectively. The reason behind this missing information is that some companies, such 
as non-public or very small companies do not expose their financial information to 
public. So the information on the number of brands, sales or employees is very difficult 
to be obtained. In the next part, we will closely describe the company information on 
sales, number of employees, and brand. 
 
 
 
Table 8. Company Information 
Information Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number of companies with 
available information  
Brand  0.10 0.30 1005 
Number of brands 0.53 3.73 974 
Number of employees 12,169.66 40,860.22 334 
Sales (million dollars) 4,202.54 14,586.27 310 
Total number of companies   1005 
Total number of recall events   1394 
Source: Data from Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
 
 
 
 
Sales 
 We were able to collect the sales (million dollars) of 310 companies from the 
total of 1,005 companies. The distribution of sales data is a right-skewed distribution 
shown in figure 6. This means we have many more companies having small sales figures 
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and relatively few companies having high sales values. Actually, the representation in 
figure 6 is difficult to comprehend because, on the left of the figure, we have numerous 
companies containing small amount of sales figures. These companies pile up so densely 
on the left side that the plot seems to have many y-intercepts. However, in fact there is 
no y-intercept at all because a company has to have at least a small amount of sales. 
 This difficulty we faced also results from the characteristics of this sales data as 
in the following. First characteristic, as stated earlier, is the data having loads of 
companies with small sales figures. Second characteristic is a very broad range of sales 
figure (presented in table 9) with a minimum of $200,000 and a maximum of $120.44 
billion. That is why it is not easy to make all of the sales levels clearly display in one 
graph. Hence, we transformed the figure 6 to a histogram, shown in figure 7 which is a 
better graphical form for understand sales distribution. 
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Figure 6. The frequency distribution of sales figures (million dollars) presented by a 
scatter plot 
Source: Data from Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
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Figure 7. A histogram of sales in million dollars distribution 
Source: Data from Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics of Sales Figures 
Statistics Values 
Number of observations  310 
Mean  $4.20 Billion 
Standard deviation  $14.59 Billion 
Minimum value  $200,000 
Maximum value  $120.44 Billion 
25th Percentile  $4 Million 
Median  $14.95 Million 
75th Percentile  $600 Million 
Source: Data from Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
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Number of Employees 
 As stated earlier, there are 334 companies from the total 1,005 companies having 
employee figures. Consider the distribution on the number of employees; the distribution 
provided in figure 8 is also skewed to the right because there is a large share of 
companies having a small number of employees. The plot in figure 8 has the same 
problem, as in figure 6. So we created a histogram, shown in figure 9, making the data 
easier to comprehend. 
 The range of the number of employees begins with a minimum of 3 employees to 
a maximum of 326,000 employees. The values are presented in table 10. Due to the wide 
range of the data and many companies having small employees figures, the employee 
data set is a right-skewed distribution with most observations compact to the left side.  
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Figure 8. The frequency distribution of the number of employees presented by a 
scatter plot 
Source: Data from Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
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Figure 9. A histogram of the number of employees distribution 
Source: Data from Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of Employee Figures 
Statistics Values 
Number of observations  334 
Mean  12,169.66 
Standard deviation  40,860.22 
Minimum value  3 
Maximum value  326,000 
25th Percentile  25 
Median  90 
75th Percentile  1,800 
Source: Data from Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
37 
Brand 
 The information available on brand is provided in table 11. 100 companies from 
a total of 1,005 companies have their own brands. In other words, they comprise about 
10 percent of all the branded companies. Among all branded companies, 68 companies 
released information regarding the number of brands. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Descriptive Information on Brand  
Information Number of companies Percent 
Have a brand  100 9.95 
Have a number of brands 68 6.77 
Total number of companies 1005 100 
Source: Data from Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Selected Variables 
 In this part, some important variables are selected to be analyzed. The purpose is 
to have more understanding on the variables and get the variables ready to be used in the 
model in the next step. 
Recall Frequency Variables 
 From a total of 1,005 companies, most companies (78.91 percent) had only one 
recall events (see table 12). Nevertheless, there are 21.09 percent of companies that had 
a repeated recall event. The number of recall events for each company ranges from a 
minimum of 1 recall to a maximum of 13 recalls. Nevertheless, 13 recalls caused by one 
company is an extreme case of recall events and, does not commonly occur. In the data, 
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there is only one company that had 13 recall events. Additionally, the average of the 
number of recall events is 1.39 (see table 13) and only 7.16 percent of companies were 
reported on the recalls three times or more (see table 12). We also provided a list of 39 
company names ranked from the most to the least number of recall events in table 22 in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
 
Table 12. Number of Companies by Number of Recall Events 
Number of recall events Number of companies Percent 
1 793 78.91 
2 140 13.93 
3 33 3.28 
4 15 1.49 
5 10 1.00 
6 5 0.50 
7 4 0.40 
8 1 0.10 
9 1 0.10 
12 2 0.20 
13 1 0.10 
Total 1,005 100.00 
≥2 212 21.09 
≥ 3 72 7.16 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a; Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
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Table 13. Descriptive Statistics of Recall Frequency 
Statistics Values 
Number of observations  1,005 
Mean  1.39 
Standard deviation  1.09 
Minimum value  1 
Maximum value  13 
25th Percentile  1 
Median  1 
75th Percentile  1 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a 
 
 
 
 
 Since about one-fifth companies were reported to have a recall event more than 
once, we created two main variables for representing the frequency of recalls: 
REPEATED and GREPEAT variables 
 REPEATED is a binary variable indicating whether a company had a repeated 
recall event or not. If a company had a repeated recall event (more than one recall 
event), this binary variable is equal to one, otherwise zero.  
 GREPEAT is a categorical variable of the occurrence of recall events. This 
variable is created by grouping the number of the recall events into three groups; non-
repeated recall event (one recall event), one repeated recall event (two recall events), and 
more than one repeated recall events (more than two recall events). In other words, we 
can look at these three levels as low, medium, and high categories of the occurrence of 
recall events by frequency order. We assigned the numbers for these three levels as zero, 
one, and two, respectively. 
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Size Categories 
 In order to obtain an accurate interpretation of the outcome, it is important to be 
extremely careful of how firms are divided.  In this section, the selection of size measure 
and method used will be discussed, followed by a description of the firm size grouping 
result.  
 In the U.S., a United States government agency called the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) has an authority to define small business. According to the Size 
Standards Division Office of Government Contracting & Business Development (2009), 
“For the ongoing comprehensive size standards review, SBA has established three 
“base” or “anchor” size standards: (1) 500 employees for manufacturing, mining and 
other industries with employee based size standards (except for Wholesale Trade); (2) 
$7.0 million in average annual receipts for most nonmanufacturing industries with 
receipts based size standards; and (3) 100 employees for all Wholesale Trade industries.” 
 SBA principally uses two criteria for classification on business size, i.e., receipts 
and the number of employees. Receipts (average annual receipts) are normally used as a 
standard-size measure by SBA since it estimates business’s output value and can be 
proved easily. While the number of employees has been mainly utilized for the 
manufacturing sector and widely applied by the government such as the Small War 
Plants Corporation and the Small Defense Plants Administration. In general, the 500-
employee size standard has gotten recognition in the government (Size Standards 
Division Office of Government Contracting & Business Development 2009). 
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 According to SBA, we adopted those size standards for determining firm size in 
our data. However, we need only one standard-size measure in the study. The number of 
employees is preferred because of two main reasons. First, the number of employees has 
used as a size standard for the manufacturing industries and also the types of company in 
the data mostly are food manufacturers. Second, the number of observations containing 
employee data, 334, is larger than the number of observation containing sales data, 310.  
Hence, for the size classification analysis, we selected the number of employees as a 
standard-size measure. 
 In selecting the method used for grouping, first we have to understand the 
characteristics of our data set. As mentioned in the company information, the employee 
data has distinct characteristics that are its non-normal distribution and skewness to the 
right. Furthermore, the employee data has a dramatically wide range of value. The range 
of number of employees begins with a minimum of 3 employees to a maximum of 
326,000 employees (see table 10). 
 Because of those reasons, we need to find an informative technique to describe 
our non-normal distributed data. The two main alternative methods we have considered 
are the Jenks natural breaks and the Quantile.  
 The Jenks natural breaks classification method is a data classification method 
that separates the data based on its natural groupings inherent in the data. The criterion 
for grouping by this method is minimizing the variance within classes while maximizing 
the variance between classes (Jenks 1967). After applying this method to the data, we 
will obtain the best similar values in each group and the best relatively different values 
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between groups. Alternatively, the Quantile method groups the data by dividing an equal 
number of observations in each category. Thus, class breaks can be considerably 
different in range’s size. 
 Because of the uniqueness of these two classification methods, we utilized both 
the Jenks natural breaks and the Quintile methods to group firms by the number of 
employees. Thus, we can capture the feasible or appropriate ways to represent the size of 
a company. Moreover, we decided to group all of the observations into five sizes from 
the smallest-sized firm to the largest-sized firm in an ascending order; size 1, size 2, size 
3, size 4, and size 5 respectively.  
 Within the same size measure, the number of employees, the difference between 
methods used for size grouping causes a substantially diverse in the number of 
companies for each size class (see table 14). It is clearly that when using the Jenks 
natural breaks method, many companies around 87 percent are put in a very small size 
(size 1). While, applying the Quantile method gave only about 21 percent of the 
companies put in the same size. Furthermore, the number of companies in each group 
using the Jenks natural breaks method is getting smaller as the company size is growing 
(shown in figure 10). The Quantile method provided an approximately equal number of 
firms in each group (66-69).  
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Table 14. Firm Size Classification by the Number of Employees Using the Jenks 
Natural Breaks and the Quantile Classification Method 
Method Firm Size Range Average 
value 
Frequency Percent 
Jenks 
natural 
breaks 
1 0-10,000 733.22 289 86.5 
2 10,001-37,000 22,872.65 17 5.1 
3 37,001-91,125 55,139.17 12 3.6 
4 91,126-178,000 134,526.10 10 3.0 
5 178,001-326,000 242,833.33 6 1.8 
Total    334 100 
Quantile 1 0-20 13.13 69 20.66 
2 21-54 35.04 67 20.06 
3 55-178 100.76 66 19.76 
4 179-2,986 1,190.85 66 19.76 
5 2,987-326,000 60,244.97 66 19.76 
Total    334 100 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. A histogram of the number of firms in each size group categorized by 
employee data using several classification methods 
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 These dissimilarities stemmed from different ranges of dividing by various 
methods and the skewness to the right of the employee data.  For example, firm size 1 
grouped by the Jenks natural breaks method has a very wide range from 0 to 10,000 
employees when compared to the Quantile method which has a narrower range from 0 to 
20 employees (see table 14). This example shows that the range in the two methods used 
to group the data are unique from each other. While the Jenks natural breaks method is 
designed to divide the data into its inherent break based on the skewness, Quantile 
method, on the other hand, is intended to provide each group with an equal number of 
observations. 
 The diagrams shown in figure 11 and figure 12 are provided to clarify the 
different of range and number of firms in each size group by applying the the Jenks 
natural breaks and the Quantile method, respectively. Each figure is a diagram of each 
firm’s employee values to illustrate the range, particularly among small firms. The bins 
according to the method categories are shown with numbers at the bottom of a diagram. 
As shown in the diagrams, there is a large number of very small firms, in other words, 
there is a large number of firms with a small number of employees. The diagrams also 
demonstrate that the Quantile method separates more groups among small firms while 
the Jenks natural breaks method combines all the small firms in to one group. For 
example, if we use the 500-employee size standard from SBA, a small business can be 
placed in size1 to size 4 for the Quantile method but it is only classified in size 1 for the 
Jenks natural breaks method. 
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 In conclusion, we decided to use the number of employees as the size measure 
and keep both of the firm size classifications by the Jenks natural breaks and the 
Quantile methods. Since, there is no universally classification method of firm size.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Range of employee values categorized by the Jenks natural breaks 
method 
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Figure 12. Range of employee values categorized by the Quantile method 
 
 
 
 
Correlation between Brands and Firm Size 
 Since, we are interested in both of the brand binary variable and the firm size 
variables, we have to consider the possible correlation between the two variables. The 
firm size variables that we used are the number of employees and we named it as 
EMPLOYEES variable and the size category variables: SIZE 1, SIZE 2, SIZE 3, SIZE 4, 
and SIZE 5 (the smallest-sized firm to the largest-sized). Each size category variable is a 
binary variable. For example, SIZE 1 equals to one, SIZE 2, SIZE 3, SIZE 4, and SIZE 5 
equal to zero, if a company is in the size 1 category. Additionally, the brand binary 
variable is named BRAND variable. 
 According to Devore (2004), we define the correlation (ρ) as follows: 
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  2. A moderate correlation:              
  3. A strong correlation:          . 
 As show in table 15, there is a significantly weak positive correlation between 
BRAND and EMPLOYEES (ρ=0.342). For both of the size classification methods, the 
correlation between BRAND and each size variable shows the same general result which 
is a weak positive correlation (see table 16 and table 17). Thus, the low correlation 
would not generate a problem if we include the brand binary variable and the firm size 
variables as independent variables in the same model.  
 Furthermore, consider the sales (million dollars) figure or SALES variable, 
EMPLOYEES and SALES are highly correlated (ρ=0.880). This supports the idea that 
we should keep only one variable for size measure. 
 
 
 
Table 15. Correlation Coefficients between Three Variables: Brand, Employees and 
Sales (million dollars) 
Variable Correlation 
Coefficient 
Significant 
Value 
Number of  
Observations 
BRAND and EMPLOYEES 0.342 <0.0001 334 
EMPLOYEES and SALES 0.880 <0.0001 308 
 
 
 
Table 16. Correlation Coefficients between Brand and Sizes by the Quantile 
Method based on Employee Data 
Variable Correlation Coefficient Significant Value 
BRAND and SIZE 1 -0.284 <0.0001 
BRAND and SIZE 2 -0.226 <0.0001 
BRAND and SIZE 3 -0.152 0.0053 
BRAND and SIZE 4 0.237 <0.0001 
BRAND and SIZE 5 0.432 <0.0001 
Note: The total observation number is 334. 
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Table 17. Correlation Coefficients between Brand and Sizes by the Jenks Natural 
Breaks Method based on Employee Data 
Variable Correlation Coefficient Significant Value 
BRAND and SIZE 1 -0.461 <0.0001 
BRAND and SIZE 2 0.352 <0.0001 
BRAND and SIZE 3 0.158 0.0039 
BRAND and SIZE 4 0.150 0.0059 
BRAND and SIZE 5 0.190 0.0005 
Note: The total observation number is 334. 
 
 
 
 
Association of Repeated Recalls with Brand 
 As shown in table 18, we observed that the proportion of corporate companies 
with a brand compared to those with no brand grows with the number of recall 
occurrences. For example, the percentages of the number of branded companies had one 
recall, two recalls, and three recalls are 6.31, 15.71, and 24.24 respectively. The average 
number of brands also increases with the number of the recall events.  The average 
numbers of brand are 0.17 for the branded companies with one recall, 1.99 for the 
branded companies with more than one recall, and 3.98 for the branded companies with 
more than two recalls. 
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Table 18. Number of Companies with Brand or No Brand and Statistical Values of 
the Number of Brands for Branded Companies for Each Number of the Recall 
Occurrences 
Number  of the 
recall 
occurrences 
Number of companies  Number of brands 
Have 
Brand 
No 
Brand 
Total  Average Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
1 50(6.31) 743(93.69) 793  0.17 1.36 0 30 
2 22(15.71) 118(84.29) 140  1.04 5.76 0 50 
3 8(24.24) 25(75.76) 33  2.32 7.00 0 32 
4 4(26.67) 11(73.33) 15  2.08 7.19 0 26 
5 5(50.00) 5(50.00) 10  9.44 16.73 0 50 
6 3(60.00) 2(40.00) 5  14.00 24.17 0 50 
7 3(75.00) 1(25.00) 4  0.67 0.58 0 1 
8 1(100) 0(0) 1  - - - - 
9 1(100) 0(0) 1  - - - - 
12 2(100) 0(0) 2  5 - 5 5 
13 1(100) 0(0) 1  - - - - 
≥2 50(23.58) 162(76.42) 212  1.99 7.79 0 50 
≥ 3 28(38.89) 44(61.11) 72  3.98 10.66 0 50 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a; Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses are row percentage numbers. 
          2) The total observation number is 1,005. 
 
 
 
 
Summary of Observations Used in the Models 
 Even though we have a total of 1,005 companies or 1,005 observations to 
examine in the study, the number of observations used in the models we are going to 
analyze is 334. The reason is that we decided to use the number of employees as a firm 
size measure and there were only 334 companies that we were able to obtain the 
numbers of employees. Thus, before we move to the methodology chapter, we 
summarize the descriptive information on the selected variables of only the observations 
used in the analyzed models in table 19. 
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Table 19. Descriptive Information on Brand and Number of Recalls of Only the 
Observations Used in the Models 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Information Number of 
Companies 
Brand 0.237 0.426 0 1 Have a brand 79 (23.65) 
Have no brand 255 (76.35) 
Number of 
brands 
1.480 6.291 0 50 Have one brand 15(4.49) 
Have more than one brand 32(9.58) 
Number of 
recalls  
1.763 1.635 1 13 Have one recall  221 (66.17) 
Have more than one recall  113 (33.83) 
Have more than two recalls 51 (15.27) 
Total number of recalls  589 
Total number of observations  334 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a; Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses are company percentage numbers. 
          2) There are 32 companies that have no information on a number of brands. 
          3) Std. Dev is a standard deviation. 
 
 
 
 
 According to table 19, the companies that have no brand (255) number greater 
than the companies that have a brand (79). Hence, we can say that this data is 
unbalanced between the branded companies and unbranded companies. Furthermore, we 
also noticed that the numbers of observations are unbalanced between the number of 
observations that has one recall event (221) and the number of observations that has a 
recurrence of a recall event or more than one recall event (113). Most of the companies, 
around 66 percent, have only one recall event. These observations should be considered 
when we analyze the data in the next step. Additional, there are only 51 companies or 15 
percent of companies that have more than two recall events. We provided a list of 31 
company names from all of these 334 companies ranked from the most to the least 
number of recall events in table 23 in Appendix A.  
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 The description of the data used in the study and the analysis of selected 
variables were presented in this chapter. Additionally, we summarized the descriptive 
information for only observations that are going to be analyzed by the methodology 
explained in the next chapter. 
  
52 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 The logit and probit models were employed to estimate the effect of company’s 
factors: branding and size on the occurrence of a repeated recall event. Thus, we will 
have the model with a binary dependent variable and the logit and probit models are 
commonly models used when a dependent variable is binary. Moreover, the two models 
are suited to predict probabilities since they constrain the response variable to lie 
between zero and one. 
 In order to estimate the logit and probit models, which are nonlinear binary 
response models, a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is indispensable (Wooldridge 
2009). “MLE has some desirable efficiency properties: it is generally the most efficient 
estimation procedure in the class of estimators that use information on the distribution of 
the endogenous variables given the exogenous variables” (Wooldridge 2002, p.385). 
Hence, the estimation method used in this study is MLE. 
 
Models Specification 
 The models used in the study examine whether the probability that a company 
has a repeated recall event, Pi, depends on factors or explanatory variables (Xij) 
associated with the company i.  
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Logit Model 
 First, we provide the main model in the logit approach: 
(8)                                                         
where  
Pi    = the probability that a company i has a repeated recall event,  
       given a set of independent variables(xi) and a set of estimated 
       parameters    ; 
       = the logistic CDF; 
REPEATEDi  = the binary variable equals one if company i has a repeated recall 
      event, otherwise zero;  
     = a logit latent or logit unobserved variable or the log odds for 
       company i; 
i   = the index for companies. 
    is attained from the underlying latent variable model: 
 (9)        
  
    
                                   , 
where  
βj   = logit parameter to be estimated for variable xij; 
xij   = jth attribute of company i; j = 1, 2, …, k; 
εi    = the error or disturbance term that has a standard logistic 
      distribution. 
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Probit Model 
 The second main model we apply in the probit approach: 
(10)                                      
where  
Pi    = the probability that a company i has a repeated recall event,  
       given a set of independent variables(xi) and a set of estimated 
       parameters    ; 
 (.)   = the standard normal CDF; 
REPEATEDi  = the binary variable equals one if company i has a repeated recall 
      event, otherwise zero;  
  
 
    = a probit latent or probit unobserved variable for company i; 
i   = the index for companies. 
      is obtained from the latent variable model: 
 (11)                                                , 
where  
Φ-1(.)   = the inverse of the CDF of the standard normal distribution; 
  j   = probit parameter to be estimated for variable xij; 
xij   = jth attribute of company i; j = 1, 2, …, k;  
ui    = the error or disturbance term that has a standard normal  
      distribution. 
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Interpreting the Logit and Probit Estimates 
 The estimated parameters from logit model in equation (8) and probit model in 
equation (10) are not directly the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the 
probability that a company has a repeated recall event (Pi). In order to compute the 
marginal effects, we have to consider the characteristic of the explanatory variables.  
 For a continuous variable like the number of employees (EMPLOYEES), the 
marginal effects can be estimated by using the first derivative of the response probability 
with respect to the independent variable of interest which is continuous. Thus, in the 
logit model, the marginal effect of continuous variable (xij) on the probability Pi would 
be 
(12)    
   
    
 
          
            
 , 
 For the probit model, the marginal effect of xij would be 
(13)   
   
    
         
   , 
where     is the standard normal density. 
 For both models, the marginal effect of xij on the probability Pi is evaluated at the 
means of the other independent variables in the model. 
 In case that the explanatory variables are dummy variables such as the BRAND 
variable, it is not appropriate to obtain the marginal effects by using the first derivative 
like we applied with the continuous variables. In this case, the marginal effect of a 
binary explanatory variable is acquired by estimating Pi at the two values of the dummy 
variable: 0 and 1 while using all of the other variables in the model at the means (Greene 
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2003). The marginal effect of the binary explanatory variable, denoted d, is determined 
as: 
 (14)                                                    
where      represents the means for all of the other independent variables in the model.  
 
Discussion of Variables 
 In this section, we identify several factors that we thought might be associated 
with food recall events. To explain our thought, we applied economic and management 
framework that can link between the factors and the possibility of having a repeated 
recall event. 
 According to the research by Joy (2010), he suggested that branding and firm 
size significantly affect the risk of a food recall event by the firm. Hence, branding and 
firm size are the two major firm-level factors that we suspect to have an effect on the 
recurrence of a recall event associated with pathogenic contamination. We first discuss 
about branding and then move to the firm size issue. 
 Branding is one of the important issues when we discuss about product quality 
and safety. Next we will explain about the relation between branding and food quality 
and food safety based on the principal-agent theory.  
 Weiss (1995 p.71) explained about the principal-agent theory as follows, “A 
principal-agent relationship is said to hold between two individuals when one (the 
principal) provides compensation to the other (the agent) to perform services desired by 
the principal but whose successful completion cannot be directly verified by the 
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principal.” In the food safety sector, we can view consumers as principals and producers 
as agents. Consumers provide money at the purchased price to producers to supply safe 
and wholesome food products; however, consumers cannot directly know whether the 
food products are safe and wholesome or not. This principal-agent problem is cause by 
the asymmetric information between the producers and consumers and makes it 
impossible for consumers to distinguish between low quality or less safe products and 
high quality or safe products. Thus firms that produce high quality or safe products will 
try to separate themselves from the others with low quality or less safe products by using 
branding as a signaling device to their consumers. 
 Firms also use brand advertising to obtain a positive reputation from consumers. 
Nelson (1970 and 1974) suggested that brand advertising could be a signaling device of 
high quality products to consumers, even though the advertisements did not carry much 
informative content. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) confirmed Nelson’s idea and also 
noted that companies invest in brand advertising in the long run to gain a reputation that 
they produce quality products. Hence, we would say that branding and brand advertising 
are practical signaling devices of high quality products to customers. 
 Lawrence, Schroeder, and Hayenga (2001) and Ollinger and Mueller (2003) also 
support the idea that branding is linked to high product quality. They stated that in the 
poultry and meat processing industry, plants usually manufacture branded products the 
sources of which can be easily revealed. Hence, the manufacturers must be very active to 
maintain product quality. 
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 Since branding is an important signal of high quality or safe products, we expect 
that a firm that has a brand will have less likelihood of a recurrence of a recall event than 
a firm without a brand. However, we have to keep in mind that a firm that has a brand or 
more than one brand will have more complexities within the firm rather than a firm 
without a brand. Thus, a bounded rationality problem may occur in a firm that has a 
brand or an umbrella brand and can lead to an increasing likelihood of having a 
recurrence of a recall event.  
 Besides branding, firm size is also one of the key factors that can be linked to the 
quality and safety of products. We will first examine firm size by looking at firm’s 
nature. Coase (1937) studied about this issue and he stated that “A firm becomes larger 
as additional transactions (which could be exchange transactions co-ordinated through 
the price mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur” (p.393). In the study, Coase 
(1937) interpreted the size of firm as employees and sales or volume.  
 As the additional transactions increases, the transactions would be likely to have 
an increase in the dissimilarity and the spatial distribution. This can result in the rising of 
the costs of organizing extra transactions and the increasing losses through mistakes by 
failing to use the factors of production at their greatest value. At this point, Coase (1937) 
argues that the firm becomes less efficient as the firm size gets larger. In other words, he 
also stated that the point can be matched with the economic concept of the “diminishing 
returns to management.” 
 In summary, this concept suggests that as a firm becomes larger, it will 
experience increasing costs of organizing and the higher losses from mistakes, due to 
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differences in places and in kinds of extra transactions. This is a reason why firm’s 
efficiency may decline as the firm increases its size. 
 Coase’s (1937) argument is also consistent with Williamson’s (1981) assertion. 
He stated that when a plant increases in size, its bureaucratic structure becomes more 
complex and difficult to be managed. This leads to the higher transaction costs that 
finally overcome benefits from economies of scale due to further growth. 
 The other idea that supports the lower efficiency of a larger firm is based on the 
bounded rationality concept. Bounded rationality has been described as a human or an 
agent behavior that is "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon 1961 as cited 
by Williamson 1981, p. 571). In complex environments, boundedly rational agents are 
limited by abilities to manage problems and to process information (Williamson 1981). 
Even though they attempt to make a rational decision, they only have a second-best 
possible solution constrained with the limitations such as available information they 
have. Therefore, more complexities within a larger firm make it become less effective in 
management. 
 Since firm management drives quality control, less effective management due to 
the growing of firm size may cause problem to the safety of food products. For example, 
if the larger firm still uses the same number of employees to work as a quality assurance 
(QA) or quality control (QC) personnel, the constraints of their ability to supervise and 
examine products in more complex environment such as a variety of products and 
processes may lead to difficulty in maintaining product process control. The 
consequence is that the less safe products are produced to the market.  
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 Furthermore, Ollinger and Mueller (2003) studied about the economics of food 
safety in meat and poultry plants. In the study, they used percent critically deficient of 
sanitation and process controls practices (SPCPs) to measure for food safety control 
effort. “A critical deficiency is a failure to adequately perform an operation that FSIS 
deems essential to plant sanitation and process control” (Ollinger and Mueller 2003, 
p.21). There are many interesting findings associated with firm size in the study as in the 
following. The first finding is that plants with smaller size had a smaller share of 
critically deficient SPCPs when comparing to the larger plants. The second finding is 
that all processing plants and large slaughter plants in high deficient SPCPs level have a 
greater likelihood to exit the industry than other plants. Moreover, the closest study by 
Joy (2010) also found that an expansion of firm size will make the risk of the firm that 
has a recurrence of a food recall event increase. 
 In contrast, we have to consider that the larger firms can get more benefits from 
economies of scale that lead to more efficiency in production process than smaller ones. 
This may assume that the products of large firms will be safe and have a good quality 
due to the efficient production process. However, it is not assured that the large firm can 
enjoy economies of scale, unless we have the information to calculate average cost of the 
firm. Hence, we cannot conclude that the large firms in this study are more efficient than 
the smaller firms. 
  According to the economics concepts and the research findings stated above, 
thus, we suspect that as firm size increases, so does firm complexity, and the probability 
of the firm has a recurrence of a recall event will also increase. However, another 
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important perspective on the large firms is that the large firms are often linked to more 
automation in production that typically makes a safer and more controlled product with 
less chance for human error (G. Acuff, personal communication). Due to the 
contradiction of these two viewpoints, the two tailed test will be used as the hypothesis 
test on the coefficient of firm size variable explained in the Hypothesis Tests section. 
 
Consideration on Missing Variables 
 Consider multiple variables that are the underlying causal factors in observed 
phenomenon. Even if these causal factors are difficult to measure, it is important to 
consider them to avoid omitted variable bias in the results. Therefore, in this study, one 
needs to understand what causes branding and what causes firm size. It might be the case 
that another latent variable that we did not include in the model could have a correlation 
with the independent variables in the model (Bessler 2009). This latent variable might 
have an effect on either branding or firm size or both of these firm-level factors. The 
effects are important to specification of the econometric model. Furthermore, if the food 
safety policy has a significant association with the occurrence of a repeated recall event, 
the variable that measures this policy must be included in the model to prevent biased 
estimation of parameters in the model (Wooldridge 2009). 
 The food safety policy or standard set by government agencies might be the 
factor that should be considered as the latent variable that could manipulate branding and 
firm size. If the food safety policy or standard is not very stringent to inspect food 
products, with infrequent sampling and testing, the government agencies may not find 
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many problems on the products. When a firm finds no problem with its products such as 
no recall, it may want to expand its production to generate more profits. In this example, 
it might be possible that the policy can have an influence on firm size.  
 It is difficult to find the appropriate measure of food safety policy and also the 
correlations between food safety policy and the occurrences of a repeated recall event. 
Further, the correlation between food safety policy and firm size or branding has been 
unclear. Additionally, this study’s unit of analysis is a company and all companies are 
subjected to the same policy. Hence, policy is constant across firms.  Also, the effect of 
policy on firm size needs to be assessed through temporal scale. Since this study does 
not include temporal variation in the model, the potential bias of excluding policy as a 
variable might not be a problem.  Therefore, the variable of food safety policy is not 
included in the model. 
 It is important to consider and be aware of other possible factors that may 
become a hidden variable and may cause the bias problem to the model unless they are 
included in the model. The bias direction depends on the sign of the estimated parameter 
of the interested variable in the model and the sign of the correlation between this 
variable and the omitted variable. If the sign of the estimated parameter and the sign of 
the correlation are the same, the bias is positive, otherwise negative (Wooldridge 2009). 
 
Hypothesis Tests 
 According to the study by Joy (2010) that is the most similar research to this 
study, he found that branding and firm size significantly affect the risk of food recall 
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event. Thus, in this study, we contend that these two factors: branding and firm size have 
an effect on the recurrence of a recall event associated with pathogenic contamination. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis we will test is that the estimated coefficient of branding 
variable (β B) in the model that controls for the effect of firm size will not be equal to 
zero. The proposed hypothesis is: 
(1)  H0: β B = 0 
 H1:  β B ≠ 0 
 In the first hypothesis test, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient of branding 
variable equals zero. As the expectation stated above, we would like to reject the null 
hypothesis by obtaining the small p-value (p < 0.01) in order to conclude that branding 
has a significant effect on the recurrence of a recall event. 
 The second hypothesis we will test is that the estimated coefficient of firm size 
variable (β FS) in the model that controls for the effect of branding will not be equal to 
zero. This hypothesis is presented as: 
(2)  H0: β FS = 0 
 H1:  β FS ≠ 0 
 In the second hypothesis test, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient of firm 
size variable equals zero. Using the same concept as discussion in the first hypothesis 
test, we would like to reject the null hypothesis by obtaining the small p-value (p < 0.01) 
in order to conclude that firm size has significantly effect on the recurrence of a recall 
event.  
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Variable Specification 
 The dependent variable is REPEATED. This binary variable sets at one if a 
company has a repeated recall event, otherwise zero. 
 The independent variables (xij) are the attributes of company that we are 
interested. The first attribute is whether a company has a brand or not. Thus, one of the 
independent variable is a brand binary variable or BRAND. BRAND was set to one if a 
company has a brand, otherwise zero. 
 The second attribute is the size of a firm that can be determined by size 
categorical variables, the number of employees, or the transformation variables of the 
number of employees. The size categorical variables are SIZE 1, SIZE 2, SIZE 3, SIZE 
4, and SIZE 5, which are all the binary variables. If a company is put in the size 1 
category, SIZE 1 equals to one, SIZE 2, SIZE 3, SIZE 4, and SIZE 5 equal to zero. The 
variable representing the number of employees in the company is EMPLOYEES. The 
transformation variables of the number of employees can be in many forms. One form is 
the number of employees in thousands (EMPLOYEES_TH). The form of firm size 
variable that we selected is the natural log of the number of employees of the company 
and Ln(EMPLOYEES) represents this variable. Due to some limitations from the size 
categorical and EMPLOYEES variables, we used only Ln(EMPLOYEES) variable for 
representing firm size variable. The limitation issue will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Empirical Model of Repeated Recall Occurrence 
 
Model 1 
 The first model, we employed the following logit model: 
(15)                 
  
    
                                   , 
where 
i   = the index for companies;  
Pi    = the probability that a company i has repeated recalls or  
       Pi (REPEATEDi =1), given the independent variables: BRANDi 
       and EMPLOYEESi; 
     = a logit latent or logit unobserved variable or the log odds for 
       company i; 
BRANDi  = the brand binary variable equals one if company i has a brand, 
      otherwise zero; 
Ln(EMPLOYEESi) = the natural log of the number of employees of company i; 
β   = parameters to be estimated; 
εi   = the error or disturbance term. 
 The estimated probability can be calculated by substitute    from equation (15) 
into equation (8). 
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Model 2 
 In the second model applied the probit model in the model 1 instead of the logit 
model. This second model is given as: 
(16)                                                              ,  
where 
i   = the index for companies;  
Φ-1(.)   = the inverse of the CDF of the standard normal distribution; 
Pi    = the probability that a company i has repeated recalls or  
       Pi (REPEATEDi =1), given the independent variables: BRANDi 
       and EMPLOYEESi; 
  
 
    = a probit latent or probit unobserved variable for company i; 
BRANDi  = the brand binary variable equals one if company i has a brand, 
      otherwise zero; 
Ln(EMPLOYEESi) = the natural log of the number of employees of company i; 
α   = parameters to be estimated; 
ui   = the error or disturbance term. 
 The estimated probability can be calculated by substitute     from equation (16) 
into equation (10). 
 In summary, the appropriate models employed to examine the effect of firm’s 
factors: branding and firm size on the recurrence of a food recall event associated with 
pathogenic contamination are logit and probit probability models. According to 
economic and management frameworks and the research involved with a firm and food 
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safety, we make assumptions that larger firm size is associated with greater likelihood of 
a recurrence of a recall event and branding is associated with lower likelihood. Then, the 
assumptions will be examined and the results will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
  
 The content in this chapter is separated into three parts. The first part provides 
the main results from the estimation of the logit and probit models frameworks that were 
shown in the prior chapter. The second part presents the additional results from other 
models we tested. The last part is the results discussion and the possible reasons for the 
results. 
 
Main Results  
 The two models: logit and probit models are estimated to clarify and predict how 
an occurrence of a repeated recall event varies by branding and company size. The 
results for logit and probit regressions illustrated in table 20 and table 21 respectively 
contain the estimated coefficients, the associated standard errors, and the marginal 
effects of the independent variables. Additionally, the table provides various measures of 
goodness of fit for the model including the Likelihood Ratio (LR), the pseudo R-squared 
(Pseudo R2), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the percent correctly predicted.  
 The results from the logit regression are consistent with the results derived from 
the probit regression. First, look at the main hypothesis tests, for both variables: 
branding and firm size (table 20). The null hypothesis that the coefficient of the variables 
equals zero was significantly rejected. This indicates that both branding and firm size 
have significant effects on the recurrence of a recall event associated with pathogenic 
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contamination. Second, the results indicate how these two factors influence the 
recurrence of a recall event. The results suggest that companies having a brand or 
branded companies are more likely to have a repeated recall event caused by pathogens 
than companies with no brand. Furthermore, the results also suggest that larger 
companies are more likely to experience a repeated recall event than the smaller ones.  
 
 
 
Table 20. Effect of Brand and Firm Size on the Occurrence of the Repeated Recall 
Event Using the Logit Model 
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Mean 
Estimate Standard error 
Intercept*** -1.859 0.287 - - 
BRAND** 0.645 0.323 0.148 0.237 
Ln(EMPLOYEES)*** 0.179 0.051 3.919*10-4 5.4748 
Likelihood Ratio*** 36.313    
Pseudo R2 0.085    
AIC 397.152    
Observations 334    
 Correct Prediction Actual   
Have repeated recalls 43 (38.05) 113   
No repeated recalls 195 (88.24) 221   
Total 238 (71.26) 334   
Note: 1) ***, **are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
          2) Numbers in parentheses are row percents correctly predicted  
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Table 21. Effect of Brand and Firm Size on the Occurrence of the Repeated Recall 
Event Using the Probit Model 
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Mean 
Estimate Standard error 
Intercept*** -1.132 0.170 - - 
BRAND**                  0.399 0.201 0.149 0.237 
Ln(EMPLOYEES)*** 0.109 0.031 3.932*10-4 5.4748 
Likelihood Ratio*** 36.197    
Pseudo R2 0.085    
AIC 397.267    
Observations 334    
 Correct Prediction Actual   
Have repeated recalls 44 (38.94) 113   
No repeated recalls 195 (88.24) 221   
Total 239 (71.56) 334   
Note: 1) ***, **are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
          2) Numbers in parentheses are row percents correctly predicted 
 
 
 
 
 As shown in table 20 and table 21, the estimated coefficients of BRAND and 
Ln(EMPLOYEES) are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level or the 
lower level. Hence, these coefficients suggest that a firm having a brand and firm size 
have a positive relationship to the probability of the occurrence of the repeated recall 
event by the firm. A sign of an effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable 
is determined by the sign of the estimated parameter of the independent variable 
(Wooldridge 2002). Furthermore, in this study, the positive sign of the estimated 
coefficient can be interpreted that the variable is associated with worse performance in 
terms of food safety. Although, the sign of the estimated parameter is adequate to define 
whether the independent variable has a positive or negative effect on the dependent 
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variable, the magnitude of the parameter is not meaningful to explain about the 
magnitude of the effect (Wooldridge 2009). 
 The estimated marginal effects are especially important for determining the 
magnitude of the effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. The 
marginal effects indicate how much the probability of the event changes when changing 
a given independent variable by one unit and holding the other variables constant. The 
results from both probit and logit approaches provided approximately the same values of 
the marginal effect of branding and firm size. The marginal effect of BRAND suggests 
that companies with a brand or branded companies are around 15 percent more likely to 
have a recurrence of a recall event compared to those with no brand. 
 The estimated marginal effect of Ln(EMPLOYEES) is difficult to interpret. By 
definition the marginal effect estimate indicates that a 1-percent increase in company 
size or the number of employees increases the likelihood of the occurrence of the 
repeated recall event by about 0.04 percent. Even though, the effect of the number of 
employees seems to be very small, 0.04 percent, it is still meaningful because it is 
statistically significant. For example, consider a single company that doubles employee 
number because of double shift or operating a new plant, the 100 percent growth in size 
is associated with a 4-percent rise in probability of the recurrence of the recall event. 
There are many small firms (around 30 firms) in the dataset for which it is feasible to 
double employee number by only hiring 3 to 10 more people. 
 The goodness of fit for the model can be measured by various statistics; 
likelihood ratio (LR), pseudo R2, and AIC. Both of the two approaches: logit and probit 
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have similar values of the statistics for all the goodness of fit measures. The LR statistic 
indicates the overall model significance. In the logit and probit model, the LR statistics 
are 36.313 and 36.197 respectively. Furthermore, the LR statistics are both significant at 
the 1 percent level. This suggests that these two models have a very significant 
explanatory power. The pseudo R2 for the two approaches is 0.085. This pseudo R2 is 
suggested by McFadden (1974) and also called the likelihood ratio index (LRI). The LRI 
indicates a perfect fit. The more LRI increases, the better the model fits (Greene 2003). 
The AIC values of the logit and probit models are 397.152 and 397.267, respectively. 
The AIC is also a fit measure of the model and can be used as a criterion of a model 
selection. Among different models, the smallest AIC value is represented the best.  
 The last goodness-of-fit measure provided is the percent correctly predicted. The 
logit and probit models have the similar percents correctly predicted as well. The overall 
percents correctly predicted of the logit and probit models are 71.26 and 71.56 percent, 
respectively. These values indicate that the overall models predict well. 
 However, some questions about correct prediction are remaining. For each of the 
outcome, the percents correctly predicted are different within the same model but similar 
between the logit and probit models. Both models are more successful in the prediction 
of the event that the repeated recall does not occur with 88 percent correctly predicted 
than the event that occurs. The percents correctly predicted for the event that the 
repeated recall occurs are 38 percent for the logit model and 39 percent for the probit 
model. The less correctly predicted for the event that the repeated recall occurs may be 
caused by the threshold value of 0.5 that we chose. Greene (2003) asserted that even 
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though the value of 0.5 is a common threshold, it may not always be the good choice to 
select in all cases such as the unbalanced data. If the data has many more observations 
that the event occurs ( yi = 1), or vice versa ( yi = 0), by using the threshold value of 0.5 
the model is hardly to predict the zero outcomes, or vice versa ( the one outcomes). 
While our data are not perfectly balanced, the 34-percent ones are sufficient to lead us to 
conclude that imbalance is not a severe problem in assessing goodness of fit. 
 
Additional Results 
 Before we decided to choose the Ln(EMPLOYEES) variables to be a firm size 
variable in the model 1 and the model 2, we tested many different forms of size 
variables; size categorical variables by the Jenks natural breaks method, size categorical 
variables by the Quantile method, the number of employees (EMPLOYEES), and the 
number of employees in thousand units (EMPLOYEES_TH). Since the results from 
logit regressions and probit regressions are very similar, only the results from logit 
regressions are included in this study. The results are shown in table 24 through table 27 
in Appendix B. 
 For all of the models using different forms of firm size variables, the results on 
branding are consistent with the results from Model 1 and Model 2 (table 20 and table 
21). That is, branded companies are positively and statistically significantly associated 
with recurrence of a recall event. In other words, companies with a brand are more likely 
to have a recurrence of a recall event compared to those with no brand. The likelihoods 
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are around 18 to 25 percent greater for branded companies than nonbranded, depending 
on forms of firm size variables used.  
 For studying the effect of firm size, first we used the size categorical variables. 
The size categorical variables are SIZE 1, SIZE 2, SIZE 3, SIZE 4, and SIZE 5 which 
are each binary variables. In the model, since we have 5 categories of firm size, we put 
only 4 categorical variables; SIZE 1, SIZE 2, SIZE 3, and SIZE 4 and leave 1 categorical 
variable, SIZE 5, out of the model to prevent the perfect multicollinearity problem. 
Hence, the interpretation of each size categorical variable is each firm size compared to 
firm size of 5 which is the reference size. For example, SIZE 1 represents firm size 1 
compare to firm size 5.  
 Two options of categorizing companies to the 5 size groups were studied: Jenks 
natural breaks method and Quantile method. In the model using size categorical 
variables by the Jenks natural breaks method, all 4 size categorical variables are not 
statistically significant. However, we noticed that SIZE 1, SIZE 2, and SIZE 3 have 
negatively nonsignificant effects on the probability that a firm has a recurrence of a 
recall event, while SIZE 4 has a positive nonsignificant effect on the probability. Even 
though, the firm size categorical variables by the Jenks natural breaks method are not 
statistically significant, the coefficient sign indicates that a firm that has a smaller size 
compared size of 5 is less likely to have a repeated recall event than a firm of size of 5 . 
 For the model using the Quantile size categorical variables, the estimated 
coefficients of SIZE 1, SIZE 2, and SIZE 3 are negative and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level or the higher level. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient of SIZE4 
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is negative but not statistically significant. Since, marginal effects are more meaningful 
than the estimated coefficients, we must interpret effects of variables from marginal 
effects. The marginal effect of SIZE 1 suggests that size 1 companies are about 23 
percent less likely to have a recurrence of a recall event compared to size 5 companies. 
Similarly, the marginal effect of SIZE 2 and SIZE 3 suggest that compared to size 5 
companies, the size 2 and size 3 companies are less likely to have a recurrence of a recall 
event by 26 and 23 percent, respectively.  
 In general, by using size categorical variables to represent firm size, we may 
conclude that the smaller firm sizes are less likely to have a repeated recall event than 
the largest firm size (size 5). The limitation for using size categorical variables is that the 
estimated marginal effects only show a tendency of a probability of smaller firm sizes 
comparing to the largest firm size. Hence, it is difficult to find the explanation of a 
marginal increasing in firm size. Moreover, since we determined firm size categories by 
a range of a number of employees, some size categories have very wide ranges of the 
number of employees so they become very difficult to interpret or to find the best 
number of employees for representing each size category. Also it is not clear that the two 
categorical methods that we used would create the firm size categories that can be the 
good representation of firm size.  
 These are the reasons why we turn back to the raw number of employees in order 
to determine firm size. For the model using the number of employees as a firm size 
variable, the coefficient of EMPLOYEES variable is positive and statistically 
significant. The result of the marginal effect suggests that a one employee increase in 
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firm size raises the probability that the firm has a recurrence of a recall event by about 
2*10-6. Because of a very small value of the marginal effect of EMPLOYEES variable, 
we tried other transformations of the number of employees variables.  
 For the model using the number of employees in thousands (EMPLOYEES_TH), 
the results are consistent with the model using EMPLOYEES variable. The marginal 
effect of EMPLOYEES_TH variable indicates that a one thousand employee increase in 
firm size raises the likelihood that the firm has a recurrence of a recall event by about 
0.002 percent. In this model, a limitation still exists because an increasing of one 
thousand employees in small firms may not be practical. For example, in the data, the 
smallest firm has only three employees. An expansion of the firm by one thousand 
employees is difficult to be possible. Thus, for small firms, the interpretation of the 
marginal effect of EMPLOYEES_TH is not quite useful. 
 At last we decided to use the natural log of the number of employees to represent 
the firm size. This is because the log form allows for possible diminishing marginal 
effects. Consider a very small firm in the data set that has only three employees, if the 
firm hires one more person, this can lead to a substantial effect on the production or the 
complexity within the firm. While considering a very large firm in the data set with a 
hundred thousand of employees, hiring one more person will have much less impact to 
the firm comparative to the very small firm. Hence, the good way to capture the possible 
diminishing effect of additional employee is to use the log transformation of the number 
of employees. 
  
77 
 In summary, even though, there are some limitations exist in the models using 
these different forms of size variables, the results of branding and firm size are always 
consistent with the models we selected (model 1 and model 2).  That is, a firm that has a 
brand is more likely to have a repeated recall event than a firm that has no brand. And 
the probability that a firm has a recurrence of a recall event increases as firm size 
increases.  
  
Discussion 
 In this part, the two major finding associated with branding and firm size will be 
discussed and also the reasonable plausible explanations will be provided. 
 
Branding 
 The first major finding is that a company that has a brand is more likely to have a 
recurrence of a food recall event associated with pathogenic contamination than a 
company without a brand. This finding is consistent with the results from Joy (2010). 
Joy (2010) found that branding by the firm raises the risk of recurrence of food recall 
incidences. However, the finding contradicts to what we expected based on other 
literature. Branding is often viewed as a key signal of high quality or safe products 
(Lawrence, Schroeder, and Hayenga 2001; Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Ollinger and 
Mueller 2003). Thus, the belief that branded products have higher quality and are safer 
than non-branded products may be wrong. Several plausible explanations for this result 
are provided in the following.  
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 The first plausible explanation is that a branded company may have substantial 
concern about its brand and reputation, thus the company may adopt a proactive-recall 
strategy in order to protect them. The firm may want to accept the recall costs of the 
proactive action rather than losing its reputation. “The expenses required to remove the 
product from the market may be minor compared to the lost consumer confidence, 
damaged brand strength, and reduced sales that follow the bad publicity” (Dwyer 1999 
as cited by Skees, Botts, and Zeuli 2001, p. 100).  
 Furthermore, a support statement why a firm would like to make a proactive 
recall is that it can lessen the negative effect from the recall incident by getting positive 
perceptions from consumers such as firm’s trustworthiness (Chen, Ganesan and Liu 
2009; Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994).  
 The reason why a firm is very concerned about its reputation is that a positive 
reputation can be interpreted as an insurance against problematic incidents. Several 
researchers also pointed out that the effect of product-harm crisis is relatively small on a 
firm that is well-known and has a positive image when comparing to an unknown firm. 
The study by Siomkos and Kurzbard (1994) found that in a product-harm crisis, a well 
known and high-reputation firm receives less negative effect from consumers’ future 
purchases and their perceptions than a low-reputation firm. Hence, damaging a 
reputation can be very costly. It would damage the firm more to delay or avoid a recall 
and later be implicated. 
 Especially, in our study we focused solely on microbiological contamination 
recall events that can cause severe health problems to consumers and gain lots of 
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attention in public. Thus, it is possible that if a branded firm suspect contaminated 
products, even before any consumers’ health problems have been reported, the firm will 
step forward and act responsibly by making a recall in order to minimize the negative 
effect from the recall incident and maintain positive consumers’ perceptions and its 
positive reputation. 
 The second plausible explanation is that a firm that produces branded products 
can be tracked and identified more easily than a firm that produces unbranded products. 
This is caused by the imperfect linkage between the cause of foodborne sickness and the 
product. For example, meat and poultry processing plants usually produces branded 
products, so the processor is more easily revealed and linked to contaminated products 
than meat and poultry slaughter plants. On the other hand, slaughter products are often 
unbranded and can be co-mingled with identical products from others suppliers by a 
buyer. Hence, the producer’s identity is obscure and difficult to identify by a buyer or 
consumer (Lawrence, Schroeder, and Hayenga 2001; Ollinger and Mueller 2003). Thus, 
the firm with a brand may have more probability of being reported by consumers for 
causing foodborne illness than the firm with no brand. 
 For the third plausible explanation, if a firm that produces branded products has 
more than one brand, the negative effect from a recurrence of a recall event may be 
lessened by a broad range of product lines under several brand names. Consumers may 
not be aware that the products with different brand names are manufactured by the same 
company. Since, the company name is not recognized by customers consuming its 
products under several brand names, the negative effect from a recall event from one 
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brand will not affect the other brands within the same company. For example, few 
customers recognize that Bisquick, Gold Medal and Betty Crocker are produced by 
General Mills. If Gold Medal products have a problem, both products from Bisquick and 
Betty Crocker will not have a negative effect associated with Gold Medal’s problem. 
This will be possible unless the media brings up the issue about the connection between 
these three brand names. Additionally, if the company produces products with different 
brand names but in the same product area, customers may think that the different brand 
names are competitors (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994). The result is that a product recall 
may not hurt the company because consumers switch to buy the other brands within the 
same company. 
 The final plausible explanation is that the firm may create new additional brand 
names in order to offset the negative effect that is caused by the recall problem of the 
previous brand name. It may be possible that every time a firm has a recall it may 
created a new brand name with a little investment. Hence, a firm with multiple brands 
may have more likelihood to have a repeated recall event. This plausible explanation is 
also linked to the previous explanation that most of the consumers cannot link between 
the difference brand names which are created by the same company. Moreover, the loss 
from a product-harm crisis is specific to one brand and does not affects the other brands 
within the same company. 
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Firm Size 
 The second major finding is that a growing of firm size increases the probability 
of a recurrence of a food recall event caused by pathogenic contamination. This finding 
is consistent with our expectation and Joy (2010). Furthermore, the finding is also in line 
with the economic concepts suggested by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1981) and the 
bounded rationality concept proposed by Simon (1961). The larger firm size is, the more 
inefficient the firm becomes. The greater inefficient stemming from the limitations of the 
management’s ability may reduce product safety. 
 Furthermore, it is more difficult for the larger firm to improve the food safety 
control practices compared with the smaller one due to complexities within the larger 
firm. Hence, the costs of improvement on the food safety control sector may very 
expensive for the larger firm than the smaller one. For example, a large company that 
had one recall event may want to improve its performance on food safety control. 
However, it may be difficult to achieve the goal. Therefore, a recall event may happen 
again. This idea is supported by Ollinger and Mueller (2003) who stated that “larger 
plants will find it more costly to reduce percent-deficient of SPCPs than smaller plants” 
(p.26). They also asserted that, to comply with quality standards, larger plants may face 
a comparatively higher cost than smaller ones. Next, we will propose other feasible 
explanations for this major finding in the following.  
 For the first feasible explanation, since the economies of scale within the firm is 
important in food industries, the larger firm may attempt to generate economies of scale 
in the food safety process control sector. By not realizing the potential limits of bounded 
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rationality, the firm may face with the food safety problem. For example, if the firm 
increases its size but does not hire more QA or QC personnel in order to get benefits 
from economies of scale, increasing the amount of products or expanding with 
differentiated in product types can limit the worker’s ability toward maintaining safety 
of the products. The result is that the less safe products may be produced to the market. 
Additionally, the firm succeeds in achieving economies of scale in production operation 
through fast or mechanized operation. This produces more at lower average cost but is 
more complex to monitor. 
  The second feasible explanation for risk of recall to increase with size is that 
large firms produce very large volumes of products. Hence, the likelihood of an incident 
that a consumer gets sick from foodborne illnesses leading to an announcement of a 
product recall is a lot greater, holding everything else equal. Therefore, larger firms 
producing larger volume of products tend to have more chance to make recalls than 
smaller ones. 
 The final feasible explanation is connected with the previous explanation. That 
is, smaller firms produce at a smaller volume of products and the products are consumed 
by fewer consumers. Even though, the firms realize that the products are contaminated, 
they may not announce a recall if the problem has not been noticed in the public. There 
are many possible reasons for small firms to avoid making a recall.  
 The first reason is that the recall costs including announcing the recall, removing, 
and replacing the products are very high. The small firm may unable to handle these 
costs, thus they end up with not implementing a recall. The second reason is that there is 
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small likelihood of a consumer to get sick from the contaminated products because small 
firms produce a small amount of products which are consumed by a few consumers. 
Thus, the small firm may risk on a little chance that food safety problem will occur yet 
not be discovered. The third reason is that the small firm may fear to have a large 
reduction of returns to shareholders after a recall event. For example, in the study of 
Salin and Hooker (2001), they found that the returns to shareholders of the smallest firm, 
Odwalla, dropped instantaneously after the recall event.  
 However, the decision to announce a product recall depends on the severity of 
the food contamination problem. If the contamination problem is severe, a firm may 
choose to announce a product recall. It will damage the firms’ reputation badly and 
create tremendous losses later due to the bad publicity, if they do not take a 
responsibility by making a recall. 
 In the opposite view, an alternative plausible explanation is that smaller firms 
may have more safety process control than the larger ones. The reason is that the smaller 
firms may have a greater fear to have a recall event so they try the best to prevent or at 
least have less of the recurrence of a recall event. The greater fear might be the fear for 
the large recall costs that may cause the firm hardly to survive or the fear of a large 
reduction of returns to shareholders due to a recall event. This explanation is also 
consistent with the finding from Ollinger and Mueller (2003) that the smaller meat and 
poultry plants had a lower proportion of critical deficient SPCPs than the larger plants. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
 This study examined the effect of branding and firm size on the probability that a 
firm has a recurrence of a recall event associated with microbiological contamination, in 
the U.S. from January, 2000 through October, 2009. The total food recall events 
involved with pathogenic contamination in this period is 1,394 recall events that were 
issued by 1,005 companies. The number of food recall events associated with pathogenic 
contamination has been growing recently. This has resulted in extensive concerns for 
consumers, government and food companies.  
 The first major finding is that firms that produce branded products are associated 
with worse performance in terms of food safety. The firms with brand are around 15 
percent more likely to have a recurrence of a recall event than firms producing 
unbranded product. This finding opposes to what we expected, that branded firm would 
perform better than a firm without brand. Branding has been commonly inferred as a key 
signal of high quality or safe products (Lawrence, Schroeder, and Hayenga 2001; 
Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Ollinger and Mueller 2003). Thus, the confidence that 
branded products have higher quality and are safer than nonbranded products may be 
mistaken. We provide several possible explanations in the following.  
 Branded companies may try to protect their brands and positive reputations by 
adopting the proactive-recall strategy. Since they depend more on consumers’ 
perceptions, the brand owner publicly issues a recall to apologize and warn consumers. 
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By quickly responding to the problem the company expects to protect its brands and 
return to normal sales more quickly than if the problem is not acknowledged publicly. 
 Moreover, firms that produce branded products may be more easily tracked and 
identified than firms with unbranded products.  
 Furthermore, firms with more than one brand name may have less negative effect 
from a recurrence of a recall event, because of compensation from other branded 
products they have. The loss for a product recall event is specific only to that troubled 
brand and some consumers cannot link between brand names and the company creating 
the brand names. Thus, it will not have a negative effect on other brand names within the 
same company and the firm is able to withstand one or more product recalls. In addition, 
the firm may create new brand names in order to offset the negative effect due to the 
recall incidence of the previous brand name. 
 Finally, it is possible that branding strategies are more common for the types of 
foods at risk for product recall. 
 The second major finding is that larger firms are associated with worse 
performance in terms of food safety comparative to smaller firms. A 1-percent increase 
in firm size as measured by the number of employees increases the likelihood of firm to 
have the recurrence of a recall event by about 0.04 percent. This worse performance due 
to the size of firm is consistent to the expectation based on the bounded rationality 
concept. Large firms may face limitations of the management’s ability and more 
complexities within the firms. Thus, after a first recall event, improving the food safety 
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control efforts in larger firms may have more difficulties than in the smaller ones. We 
proposed several possible explanations for this finding. 
 The larger firm may attempt to create economies of scale in the overall 
production process, but is not able to assure benefits in safety and quality along with the 
increased production. 
 Moreover, very large amount of products are produced by larger firms. For 
example, in meat and poultry processing industry, many manufacturers such as Tyson 
Foods, Inc. have slaughtering and processing plants that produce products in millions of 
pounds. Hence, the likelihood of a consumer getting sick from foodborne illnesses that 
lead the firms to announce a product recall is greater. On the other hand, due to the small 
volume of products produced by smaller firm, the smaller firm may have an incentive to 
not announce a recall if the problem has not been noticed in the public. 
 The findings from this study can have implications for policy makers and also 
managers of private sectors, food companies. The policy makers should not take 
branding as an indicator of food safety performance. Since the large company or branded 
company tend to have more risk of making a repeated recall event caused by pathogens, 
policy makers should pay extra attentions to these types of companies. They may 
carefully observe the food safety control efforts of these types of firms by using more 
strict regulations or providing alternative standards in order to prevent severe foodborne 
illnesses that may happen with their food.  
 In case of the private sectors or food companies, they should view product recall 
as one of many management tools. In addition, if they are large firms or branded firms, 
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the implication may be that they should take the results as guidelines for their food 
safety control standards. For example, they may take more precautions or put more 
efforts on their safety in the process control sectors since the high comparative 
probability of having a recurrence of recall event. 
 The study also has a limitation on the data resource. We used the data of food 
recall events as an inference of food safety quality. Although, this is the best data that we 
could obtain, someone may view the food recall events data as inadequate data. The 
main weakness is that FSIS or FDA only takes a random sample of food products and 
does not examine all products. FDA also rarely samples and tests products. Hence, we 
cannot infer that all of the product that has no recall will be safe. Thus, the further 
research we suggested is that we may use alternative measure for food quality control 
effort.  
 In addition, further possible research is the developing of the same model used in 
this study by including other factors which may be significantly associated with product 
recalls such as the product types. Furthermore, future research may employ more 
complex models as the alternative model approaches such as ordered logit, ordered 
probit, multinomial logit, or multinomial probit. These methods are examples that might 
be helpful to understanding about food safety problems. 
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APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Table 22. Top 39 Companies from All of 1,005 Companies in the Food Recall Event 
Data Ranked by Number of Recalls  
Rank Company Name Number 
of  
Recalls 
Product Type of Recalls Brand 
Binary 
Employees Sales 
(Million 
Dollars) 
1 The Kroger Co. 13 Dairy(5), Nut(3), 
Meat(2), Others(1), 
Fruit-Vegetables(1), 
Confectionary-Bakery(1) 
1 32,6000 76,000.0 
2 Cargill, 
Incorporated 
12 Meat(12) 1 160,000 120,439.0 
2 Whole Foods 
Market, Inc. 
12 Nut(7), Meat(2), 
Confectionary-Bakery 
(2), Others(1) 
1 52,900 7,953.9 
3 Kellogg Company 9 Confectionary-Bakery 
(6), Nut(3) 
1 32,400 12,822.0 
4 Supervalu Inc. 8 Meat(4),  Dairy(2), 
Confectionary-
Bakery(1),  Nut(1) 
1 178,000 
 
44,564.0 
5 Giant Food Inc. 7 Dairy(5), Meat(1), 
Nut(1) 
1 27,000 N/A 
5 Tyson Food, Inc. 7 Meat(7) 1 107,000 26,862.0 
5 Harry & David 
Holdings, Inc. 
7 Meat(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
1 1,321 545.1 
5 Peregrina Cheese 
Corporation 
7 Dairy(7) 0 N/A N/A 
6 Kraft Foods Inc. 6 Nut(2), Confectionary-
Bakery(1), Dairy(1), 
Others(1), Meat(1) 
1 98,000 42,201.0 
6 Smithfield Foods, 
Inc. 
6 Meat(6) 1 52,400 11,200.0 
6 ALDI Group 6 Confectionary-Bakery 
(3), Fruit-Vegetables(1), 
Nut(1), Meat(1) 
1 885 65,700.0 
6 John B. Sanfilippo 
& Son, Inc 
6 Nut(6) 0 1,350 553.8 
6 New Era Canning 
Company 
6 Fruit-Vegetables(6) 0 250 34.1 
7 Dean Foods 
Company 
5 Dairy(5) 1 25,820 12,454.6 
7 General Mills, Inc.  5 Confectionary-Bakery 
(2), Fruit-Vegetables(1), 
Nut(1), Meat(1) 
1 30,000 13,652.1 
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Table 22. Continued 
Rank Company Name Number 
of  
Recalls 
Product Type of Recalls Brand 
Binary 
Employees Sales 
(Million 
Dollars) 
7 Hanover Foods 
Corporation 
5 Meat(2), Others(2) 1 2,205 290.3 
7 Swiss-American, 
Inc. 
5 Dairy(5) 1 100 N/A 
7 Betty Lou's, Inc. 5 Confectionary-Bakery 
(4), Nut(1) 
0 75 7.3 
7 Palmer Candy 
Company 
5 Nut(4), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
0 130 18.6 
7 Ralcorp Holdings, 
Inc. 
5 Confectionary-Bakery 
(4), Nut(1) 
1 9,000 2,824.4 
7 Eilleen's Candies, 
Inc. 
5 Confectionary-Bakery(5) 0 N/A N/A 
7 GKI Foods Inc. 5 Nut(5) 0 N/A N/A 
7 Union International 
Food Company 
5 Fruit-Vegetables(5) 0 N/A N/A 
8 Rosen's Diversified, 
Inc. 
4 Meat(4) 0 8,000 N/A 
8 Clearly Canadian 
Beverage 
Corporation 
4 Confectionary-Bakery 
(2), Nut(2) 
1 36 10.6 
8 Kerry Group plc 4 Nut(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
1 22,008 6,752.6 
8 Publix Super 
Markets, Inc. 
4 Nut(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
0 144,000 24,109.6 
8 Golden Taste, Inc. 4 Meat(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1)  
0 13 1.0 
8 Lance, Inc. 4 Confectionary-Bakery(4) 1 4,800 825.5 
8 Meijer, Inc. 4 Dairy(2), Meat(1), 
Confectionary-Bakery(1) 
0 60,000 13,700 
8 Nebraska Beef, Ltd 4 Meat(4) 0 1,000 96.3 
8 PRG Packing Corp 4 Meat(4) 0 96 15.5 
8 Rich Ice Cream Co. 4 Dairy(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
0 134 11.6 
8 Walgreen Co. 4 Confectionary-Bakery 
(2), Nut(2) 
1 238,000 63,335 
8 House of Flavors 
Ice Cream 
Company 
4 Dairy(4) 0 N/A N/A 
8 Mountain Man Nut 
& Fruit Co. 
4 Nut(4) 0 N/A N/A 
8 Peanut Corporation 
of America 
4 Nut(4)  0  N/A N/A 
8 Setton International 
Foods, Inc. 
4 Nut(4) 0 N/A N/A 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a; Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
Note: 1) If a company has a brand, Brand Binary equals one, otherwise zero. 
         2) Numbers in parentheses are numbers of recalls for each product type. 
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Table 23. Top 31 Companies from All of 334 Companies Used in the Models 
Ranked by Number of Recalls  
Rank Company Name Number 
of 
Recalls 
Product Type of Recalls Brand 
Binary 
Employees Sales 
(Million 
Dollars) 
1 The Kroger Co. 13 Dairy(5),Nut(3), 
Meat(2),Others(1), Fruit-
Vegetables(1), 
Confectionary-Bakery(1) 
1 326,000 76,000.0 
2 Cargill, 
Incorporated 
12 Meat(12) 1 160,000 120,439.0 
2 Whole Foods 
Market, Inc. 
12 Nut(7), Meat(2), 
Confectionary-Bakery 
(2), Others(1) 
1 52,900 7,953.9 
3 Kellogg Company 9 Confectionary-Bakery 
(6), Nut(3) 
1 32,400 12,822.0 
4 Supervalu Inc. 8 Meat(4),  Dairy(2), 
Nut(1), Confectionary-
Bakery (1) 
1 178,000 44,564.0 
5 Giant Food Inc. 7 Dairy(5), Meat(1), 
Nut(1) 
1 27,000 N/A 
5 Tyson Foods, Inc. 7 Meats(7) 1 107,000 26,862.0 
5 Harry & David 
Holdings, Inc. 
7 Meat(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(4) 
1 1,321 545.1 
6 Kraft Foods Inc 6 Nut(2), Dairy(1), 
Others(1), Meat(1), 
Confectionary-
Bakery(1),  
1 98,000 42,201.0 
6 Smithfield Foods, 
Inc. 
6 Meat(6) 1 52,400 11,200.0 
6 ALDI Group 6 Confectionary-Bakery 
(3), Fruit-Vegetables(1), 
Nut(1), Meat(1) 
1 885 65,700.0 
6 John B. Sanfilippo 
& Son, Inc. 
6 Nut(6) 0 1,350 553.8 
6 New Era Canning 
Company 
6 Fruit-Vegetables (6) 0 250 34.1 
7 Dean Foods 
Company 
5 Dairy(5) 1 25,820 12,454.6 
7 General Mills, Inc 5 Confectionary-Bakery 
(2), Fruit-Vegetables(1), 
Nut(1), Meat(1) 
1 30,000 13,652.1 
7 Hanover Foods 
Corporation 
5 Meat(2), Others(3) 1 2,205 290.3 
7 Swiss-American, 
Inc. 
5 Dairy(5) 1 100 N/A 
7 Betty Lou's, Inc. 5 Confectionary-Bakery 
(4), Nut(1) 
0 75 7.3 
7 Palmer Candy 
Company 
5 Nut(4), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
0 130 18.6 
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Table 23. Continued 
Rank Company Name Number 
of 
Recalls 
Product Type of Recalls Brand 
Binary 
Employees Sales 
(Million 
Dollars) 
7 Ralcorp Holdings, 
Inc. 
5 Confectionary-Bakery 
(4), Nut(1) 
1 9,000 2,824.4 
8 Rosen's Diversified, 
Inc. 
4 Meats(4) 0 8,000 N/A 
8 Clearly Canadian 
Beverage 
Corporation 
4 Confectionary-Bakery 
(2), Nut(2) 
1 36 10.6 
8 Kerry Group plc 4 Nut(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
1 22,008 6,752.6 
8 Publix Super 
Markets, Inc. 
4 Nut(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
0 144,000 24,109.6 
8 Golden Taste, Inc. 4 Meat(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1)  
0 13 1.0 
8 Lance, Inc. 4 Confectionary-Bakery(4) 1 4,800 825.5 
8 Meijer, Inc. 4 Dairy(2), Meat(1), 
Confectionary-Bakery(1) 
0 60,000 13,700 
8 Nebraska Beef, Ltd 4 Meat(4) 0 1,000 96.3 
8 PRG Packing Corp 4 Meat(4) 0 96 15.5 
8 Rich Ice Cream Co. 4 Dairy(3), Confectionary-
Bakery(1) 
0 134 11.6 
8 Walgreen Co. 4 Confectionary-Bakery 
(2), Nut(2) 
1 238,000 63,335 
Source: Data from FSIS 2009; FDA 2009a; Hoover’s Inc. 2009 
Note: 1) If a company has a brand, Brand Binary equals one, otherwise zero. 
         2) Numbers in parentheses are numbers of recalls for each product type. 
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APPENDIX B 
ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 
Table 24. Effect of Brand and Firm Size on the Occurrence of the Repeated Recall 
Event Using Size Categorical Variables by the Jenks Natural Breaks Method  
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Mean 
Estimate Standard error 
Intercept -0.080 0.913 - - 
BRAND** 0.946 0.303 0.224 0.237 
SIZE 1 -1.001 0.909 -0.227 0.865 
SIZE 2 -0.140 1.019 -0.035 0.051 
SIZE 3 -0.120 1.069 -0.030 0.036 
SIZE 4 0.963 1.197 0.227 0.030 
Likelihood Ratio*** 34.388    
Pseudo R2 0.080    
AIC 405.077    
Observations 334    
 Correct Prediction Actual   
Have repeated recalls 26 (23.01) 113   
No repeated recalls 210 (95.02) 221   
Total 236 (70.66) 334   
Note: 1) ***, **are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
          2) Numbers in parentheses are row percents correctly predicted 
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Table 25. Effect of Brand and Firm Size on the Occurrence of the Repeated Recall 
Event Using Size Categorical Variables by the Quantile Method  
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Mean 
Estimate Standard error 
Intercept -0.139 0.315 - - 
BRAND** 0.747 0.320 0.182 0.237 
SIZE 1** -1.059 0.425 -0.234 0.207 
SIZE 2*** -1.233 0.428 -0.263 0.201 
SIZE 3** -1.011 0.406 -0.225 0.198 
SIZE 4 -0.504 0.360 -0.121 0.198 
Likelihood Ratio*** 34.219    
Pseudo R2 0.080    
AIC 405.245    
Observations 334    
 Correct Prediction Actual   
Have repeated recalls 43 (38.05) 113   
No repeated recalls 195 (88.24) 221   
Total 238 (71.26) 334   
Note: 1) ***, **are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
          2) Numbers in parentheses are row percents correctly predicted 
 
 
 
Table 26. Effect of Brand and Firm Size on the Occurrence of the Repeated Recall 
Event Using the Raw Number of Employees 
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Mean 
Estimate Standard 
error 
Intercept*** -1.061 0.144 - - 
BRAND*** 1.043 0.283 0.245 0.237 
EMPLOYEES** 9.733*10-6 3.92*10-6 1.967*10-6 12,169.665 
Likelihood Ratio*** 31.706    
Pseudo R2 0.074    
AIC 401.759    
Observations 334    
 Correct Prediction Actual   
Have repeated recalls 34 (30.09) 113   
No repeated recalls 203 (91.86) 221   
Total 237 (70.96) 334   
Note: 1) ***, **are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
          2) Numbers in parentheses are row percents correctly predicted  
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Table 27. Effect of Brand and Firm Size on the Occurrence of the Repeated Recall 
Event Using the Number of Employees in Thousand Unit 
Variable Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Mean 
Estimate Standard 
error 
Intercept*** -1.061 0.144 - - 
BRAND*** 1.043 0.283 0.245 0.237 
EMPLOYEES_TH** 0.010 0.004 0.002 12.170 
Likelihood Ratio*** 31.706    
Pseudo R2 0.074    
AIC 401.759    
Observations 334    
 Correct Prediction Actual   
Have repeated recalls 34 (30.09) 113   
No repeated recalls 203 (91.86) 221   
Total 237 (70.96) 334   
Note: 1) ***, **are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
          2) Numbers in parentheses are row percents correctly predicted  
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